State v. Arave, 2011 UT 84

Arave offered an eleven-year-old boy $20 to allow him to perform oral sex, triggering an initial charge of attempted sodomy on a child.
Defense moved to dismiss the attempted sodomy charge, arguing the conduct amounted to solicitation only; trial court denied.
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction for attempted sodomy, rejecting the Shondel-based argument.
Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed in part; held solicitation can include soliciting a victim and that solicitation alone is not a substantial step toward attempt.
Court concluded there was no credible substantial-step evidence beyond solicitation; remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Procedural posture: conviction for attempted sodomy reversed; solicitation conviction remains viable only if applicable under parameters set forth in the opinion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Utah solicitation cover soliciting a victim to participate in a crime?	Arave: solicitation covers only third-party solicitations.	Arave: solicitation does not reach victim-specific solicitations.	Solicitation can encompass soliciting a victim to participate.
Do the statutes for attempt and solicitation violate Shondel when not wholly duplicative?	Arave: Shondel bars duplicative charges.	Arave: statutes are not wholly duplicative because elements differ.	No Shondel problem; both crimes require different elements.
Is solicitation alone a substantial step toward a crime for purposes of attempt?	Arave: solicitation constitutes a substantial step.	Arave: solicitation is insufficient for a substantial step beyond mere solicitation.	Solicitation alone is not a substantial step; cannot sustain an attempt conviction.
Was there sufficient evidence of a substantial step beyond solicitation to support the attempt conviction?	State argued conduct rose to a substantial step.	No credible substantial-step evidence beyond solicitation.	No credible substantial-step evidence; reverse on appeal's justification.
How should the court treat dual charging when not duplicative?	State could charge both attempt and solicitation.	Charging both would overreach if not supported by substantial-step.	Remand consistent with holding that attempt requires more than solicitation; dual charging permissible only with substantial-step evidence.

State v. Shondel, 458 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969) (establishes Shondel doctrine for duplicative offenses with different penalties)
State v. Williams, 175 P.3d 1029 (Utah 2007) (equal protection concerns in duplicative offenses)
Commonwealth v. Cauto, 535 A.2d 602 (Pa. Super. 1987) (solicitation extends to victims lacking capacity to consent)
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 442 A.2d 760 (Pa. Super. 1982) (solicitation of undercover officers)
United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007) (defines substantial step and requires action beyond mere intent)