385 P.3d 1092
Or. Ct. App.2016Background
- Defendant (a contractor) and a coworker were sent to repair a homeowner’s gas fireplace on the first floor and the crawl space; the homeowner permitted access to those specific areas and the first-floor bathroom.
- After an initial visit they left and later returned the same evening to complete work; the homeowner planted bait money and videotaped the home suspecting theft.
- Video showed defendant take money and an iPhone from first-floor drawers and then walk toward the stairs to the second floor; items from upstairs were later missing.
- Defendant admitted the theft (second-degree theft) but was tried on first-degree burglary (unlawful entry/remain in a dwelling with intent to commit a crime); he moved for judgment of acquittal on the burglary count, arguing no unlawful trespass.
- The State’s theory: defendant’s permission was spatially limited to first-floor, crawl space, and garage, so going upstairs exceeded that license and constituted unlawful remaining (trespass) supporting burglary.
- The trial court denied the judgment motion; the jury convicted on burglary and found the dwelling was “occupied.” Defendant appealed both sufficiency of trespass and the occupied-dwelling sentencing classification.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence was sufficient to prove defendant "entered or remained unlawfully" (trespass) by going upstairs | Homeowner limited permission to first-floor, crawl space, garage and bathroom; going upstairs exceeded that license, so remaining was unlawful and supports burglary | Permission to enter the home extended to the house generally; homeowner did not expressly forbid upstairs, so no unlawful remaining | Court held evidence sufficient: spatial limits were implied by the areas authorized, so going upstairs exceeded the license and could be trespass supporting burglary |
| Whether the trial court plainly erred by failing to strike the "occupied dwelling" classification (for sentencing) | Sufficient evidence showed coworker Larson was present in the home or crawl space during the offense, satisfying “occupied” | Defendant argued dwelling was unoccupied because the homeowner was absent; classification should have been struck sua sponte | Court declined plain-error relief: legal question not ‘‘obvious’’ on the record and appellate precedent did not make error apparent |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Evans, 267 Or. App. 762 (Or. Ct. App. 2014) (upholding burglary conviction where defendant exceeded express spatial permission to use a bathroom and entered a bedroom)
- State v. Holte, 170 Or. App. 377 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that violating an express condition of stay in the house revoked license to remain and supported burglary)
- State v. Hartfield, 290 Or. 583 (Or. 1981) (criminal trespass is an essential element of burglary)
- State v. Werner, 281 Or. App. 154 (Or. Ct. App. 2016) (standard for reviewing denial of judgment of acquittal and discussion of trespass theory distinction)
- State v. Johnson, 116 Or. App. 252 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (defining "occupied" for sentencing guidelines as someone being inside the building at time of burglary)
- State v. Brown, 310 Or. 347 (Or. 1990) (criteria for when an error is "apparent on the record" for plain-error review)
- State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160 (Or. 2009) (statutory construction principles for discerning legislative intent)
