State v. Andy J. Parisi
875 N.W.2d 619
Wis.2016Background
- Police responded to a 12:38 a.m. medical call for a man who was unresponsive; officers and fire personnel administered Narcan and transported Andy J. Parisi to the hospital.
- At the residence officers found drug paraphernalia including a bindle that appeared to be heroin; officers had suspicion Parisi had used drugs.
- Officer Fenhouse, who followed Parisi to the hospital, requested and obtained a nonconsensual blood draw at the hospital without a warrant; testing later detected opiates and morphine.
- The State relied on a scientific article (Rook) showing heroin is rapidly metabolized (heroin detectable minutes, 6‑monoacetylmorphine ~1–3 hours), and argued delay to obtain a warrant would risk loss of the most probative evidence.
- Parisi moved to suppress the blood-test evidence; the circuit court denied the motion finding exigent circumstances under a totality‑of‑the‑circumstances analysis.
- The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding the warrantless draw was constitutional under the exigent‑circumstances exception and declined to reach the good‑faith exception issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw | Parisi: no exigency — metabolites (morphine) remain detectable for hours; officers could have obtained a warrant (multiple officers available) or sought one while he was stabilized; totality does not support exigency | State: yes — heroin and its first metabolite dissipate rapidly, officer reasonably believed delay (≈2 hours to obtain warrant) risked destruction of the most probative evidence | Held: Exigent circumstances existed under an objective totality test; warrantless blood draw was constitutional |
| Whether the presence of morphine in blood means no exigency (i.e., that evidence of heroin would not be lost) | Parisi: morphine persists for many hours so loss of evidence was not likely; morphine + scene corroboration suffices for prosecution | State: officer need only reasonably believe delay risked losing the most probative evidence (heroin or 6‑MAM); actual later detection of morphine is irrelevant to the officer’s contemporaneous beliefs | Held: Presence of morphine after the fact does not negate what a reasonable officer could have believed at the time; exigency may be based on loss of the more probative markers |
| Whether McNeely's rejection of per se dissipation rules precludes exigency here because this is not a drunk‑driving case | Parisi: McNeely forbids per se dissipation rules and requires warrants where reasonable; non‑DRIVING context means privacy interests are stronger and exigency less likely | State: McNeely requires case‑by‑case analysis; non‑driving status doesn’t preclude exigency where the totality supports a reasonable belief of imminent evidence loss | Held: McNeely governs and the court used a totality‑of‑the‑circumstances analysis; nondriving context does not automatically preclude exigency here |
| Whether suppression should be avoided under the good‑faith exception (alternative grounds) | Parisi: suppression necessary if no exigency; good‑faith not determinative in this appeal | State: court of appeals had relied on good‑faith reliance on then‑controlling precedent (Bohling) | Held: Supreme Court did not reach good‑faith exception because it found the draw constitutional under exigent circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (rejecting per se dissipation rule; exigency assessed case‑by‑case under totality of circumstances)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (warrantless blood draw implicates Fourth Amendment but may be justified by exigency)
- State v. Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421 (Wis. 2014) (application of exigent‑circumstances analysis to blood draws)
- State v. Foster, 360 Wis. 2d 12 (Wis. 2014) (discussing good‑faith/exclusionary rule issues post‑McNeely)
- State v. Kennedy, 359 Wis. 2d 454 (Wis. 2014) (same)
- State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529 (Wis. 1993) (earlier Wisconsin decision treating dissipation as exigency in drunk‑driving context; later abrogated by McNeely)