State v. Andriulaitis, 150 A.3d 720

Defendant William Andriulaitis lived with his wife and daughter, Kalie, at 61 Curtiss Road; family relations were tense and defendant had a history of physical abuse of Kalie.
After Kalie’s mother died, Kalie went to retrieve belongings from the home escorted by police officer Michael Smegielski; defendant was inside with others and allegedly told them to lock a bedroom door before the encounter.
When Kalie and Officer Smegielski approached, defendant emerged shouting profanities (including “F* you. She doesn’t live here. I don’t want her here.”) and prevented Kalie from entering to retrieve her possessions.
Defendant was charged with disorderly conduct under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-182(a)(2) and criminal lockout; convicted of disorderly conduct after a bench trial and acquitted of the lockout counts.
On appeal defendant argued (1) the trial court failed to apply or state the Indrisano gloss that “offensive or disorderly conduct” means conduct that is “grossly offensive under contemporary community standards,” and (2) the evidence was insufficient to show his conduct met that Indrisano standard.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court’s failure to expressly reference the Indrisano gloss requires reversal	Court presumed to have applied the proper legal standard; silence does not show error	Court erred by not explicitly finding conduct was "grossly offensive under contemporary community standards"	Rejected — presumption that trial court applied Indrisano, no record evidence to rebut it
Whether the evidence was sufficient to show defendant’s conduct was "grossly offensive" under Indrisano	State: defendant shouted profanities, planned confrontation, blocked lawful activity — a reasonable factfinder could find conduct grossly offensive	Defendant: conduct was limited to raised voice and a single curse; insufficient to meet Indrisano	Affirmed — viewing evidence favorably to prosecution, a rational trier could find elements beyond a reasonable doubt
Whether First Amendment / fighting-words doctrine required reversal because conduct was purely speech	State: conduct included more than speech (blocking doorway, threatening demeanor), so fighting-words limitation not implicated	Defendant: verbal profanities should be protected and not criminalized absent fighting words	Court: fighting-words limitation does not apply because conduct was not purely speech; conviction stands

State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795 (Conn. 1994) (interpreting § 53a-182(a)(2): offensive or disorderly conduct means conduct that is grossly offensive under contemporary community standards)
State v. Scott, 83 Conn. App. 724 (Conn. App. 2004) (applies Indrisano framework to disorderly conduct review)
State v. Mann, 102 Conn. App. 345 (Conn. App. 2007) (discusses sufficiency review and § 53a-182 elements)
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (U.S. 1973) (defines contemporary community standards in obscenity context)
United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule No. 2102, 709 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1983) (explains application of contemporary community standards)