State v. Anderson (Slip Opinion), 2017 Ohio 5656

Background

In April 2012, then-16-year-old Rickym Anderson and codefendant Dylan Boyd participated in armed robberies and a kidnapping; Anderson was arrested with a victim’s cell phone and a firearm was recovered nearby.
Juvenile court transferred Anderson to adult common pleas; grand jury indicted both for multiple aggravated robberies, kidnapping, and felonious assault with firearm specifications.
Boyd pleaded guilty to several counts, agreed to testify, and received a recommended nine-year sentence; Anderson went to trial, was convicted of three aggravated robberies and one kidnapping (with firearm specs), and was originally sentenced to 28 years; resentenced to an aggregate 19 years.
Anderson appealed, arguing (1) his longer sentence compared to Boyd’s reflected an unconstitutional "trial tax" for exercising his right to trial, and (2) Ohio’s mandatory-minimum sentencing scheme (including a 3-year firearm specification) is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles because it prevents individualized juvenile sentencing and violates the Eighth and Due Process Clauses.
The Second District affirmed resentencing; the Ohio Supreme Court granted review on (1) trial-tax inference from sentencing disparity and (2) whether mandatory R.C. 2929 sentencing is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles.
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed: (a) no impermissible trial tax where the court expressly said it did not punish Anderson for going to trial and factual differences (plea+cooperation vs. conviction at trial) justified disparity; (b) mandatory three-year minimums for first-degree felonies and firearm specifications imposed on juveniles tried as adults do not violate the Eighth Amendment; the due-process challenge was forfeited for not being raised below.

Issues

Issue	Anderson's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether a longer sentence for a defendant who went to trial (vs. a codefendant who pled) creates an inference of an unconstitutional "trial tax"	The disparity—two defendants equally culpable—raises a presumption of punishment for exercising the right to trial absent other justification	Sentencing disparities are not per se proof of a trial penalty; plea agreements legitimately yield lesser sentences and the trial court expressly stated it did not penalize Anderson for going to trial	No trial tax: court may rely on legitimate distinctions (plea/cooperation, convictions) and the judge’s explicit statement dispelled the inference; sentence was within statutory range
Whether mandatory minimum sentencing (including a 3-year firearm specification) applied to juveniles tried as adults violates the Eighth Amendment or requires individualized juvenile consideration	Mandatory schemes treat juveniles as adults and foreclose individualized sentencing tied to youth characteristics; thus they are unconstitutional as applied to children	Ohio statutes still allow sentencing within a broad statutory range and serve legitimate penological goals; no national consensus bars mandatory minimums for juveniles tried as adults	No Eighth Amendment violation: (1) no national consensus against such mandatory minimums for juveniles; (2) the penalties at issue are materially less than the harshest juvenile punishments (death, LWOP); (3) firearm specification and 3-year minimum are proportionate and legitimate; due-process challenge forfeited

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide violates the Eighth Amendment and requires individualized sentencing consideration)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment prohibits life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders; courts must consider youth-related mitigating factors)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for offenders under 18)
Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978) (States may encourage guilty pleas by offering substantial benefits; plea-versus-trial disparity is not per se unconstitutional)
State v. White, 142 Ohio St.3d 277 (2015) (Ohio recognizes that firearm specifications enhance punishment to deter firearm use during crimes)