State v. Anderson
2013 Iowa App. LEXIS 732
| Iowa Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Michael Anderson pled guilty (Marshall County) to sexual exploitation of a minor (aggravated misdemeanor) and received a concurrent two‑year term plus a ten‑year special sentence under Iowa Code §903B.2.
- Anderson was also serving longer consecutive prison terms in Story County; dispute arose over when his §903B.2 special sentence must be treated as commencing and whether he must be placed on parole.
- The Iowa Supreme Court held §903B.2 requires the special sentence to be calculated as if it began when the underlying sentence (the Marshall County two‑year term) was discharged. State v. Anderson, 782 N.W.2d 155 (Iowa 2010).
- Anderson sought immediate release to parole for the ten‑year special sentence to avoid or delay civil commitment proceedings under Iowa Code ch. 229A.
- The district court denied relief, concluding §903B.2 does not require actual release on parole but only that the special sentence run “as if on parole,” and that the special sentence can continue to run while Anderson remains imprisoned or is civilly detained.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §903B.2 mandates release on parole for the 10‑year special sentence | Anderson: “shall” creates mandatory duty; "as if on parole" and §906.1’s definition of parole (release) means he must be released on parole | State: §903B.2 requires supervision "as if on parole," not actual early release; parole decisions are executive functions | The court held §903B.2 does not require physical release; special sentence may run "as if on parole" while incarcerated or civilly detained |
| Whether the special sentence must run immediately after the underlying sentence despite concurrent longer sentences | Anderson: special sentence must begin immediately after discharge of underlying sentence | State: special sentence can be calculated but may overlap with other incarceration or commitment | Court reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s earlier holding that the special sentence is calculated as if it began when the underlying sentence discharged |
| Whether civil commitment proceedings (ch. 229A) suspend or delay the running of the special sentence | Anderson: being civilly committed would prevent completion of parole term; he sought respite to complete special sentence | State: chapter 229A detention does not entitle defendant to temporary release to complete special sentence | Court held special sentence continues to run notwithstanding imprisonment or civil commitment; no entitlement to temporary respite |
| Whether the district court had authority to order parole placement | Anderson: sought court modification to force parole board to release him | State: parole board is executive agency with authority over parole decisions | Court noted parole placement is executive function and denied request; court cannot compel parole release |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Anderson, 782 N.W.2d 155 (Iowa 2010) (held §903B.2 special sentence is calculated as if it began when underlying sentence was discharged and may run "as if on parole")
- State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 2000) (noting that the use of "shall" imposes a statutory duty)
- State v. Hearn, 797 N.W.2d 577 (Iowa 2011) (articulating statutory‑construction principles: give effect to legislature's intent and focus on statutory words as a whole)