State v. AndersonÂ
254 N.C. App. 765
| N.C. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Defendant Charles M. Anderson Jr., a registered sex offender (prior lewd and lascivious molestation), registered in Graham County in 2014 and acknowledged statutory location restrictions.
- Officers observed Anderson in a green SUV in a parking lot shared by Eagle Knob Learning Center (a daycare) and adjacent businesses; he was ~75 feet from the daycare while the daycare and other businesses were closed.
- A grand jury indicted Anderson under N.C.G.S. § 14-208.18(a)(1) (on the premises of a place primarily for minors) and (a)(2) (within 300 feet of such a place located on mixed-use premises); he was tried by jury on the (a)(1) charge and convicted.
- After the jury verdict, Anderson pled guilty to the (a)(2) charge and other counts (failure to report new address; habitual felon enhancements); the trial court entered concurrent sentences.
- While the appeal was pending, federal courts (M.D.N.C. and the Fourth Circuit) held § 14-208.18(a)(2) unconstitutional as overbroad under the First Amendment.
- The Court of Appeals: reversed the (a)(1) conviction (insufficient evidence that the shared parking lot was the daycare’s "premises"); adopted the Fourth Circuit’s holding that (a)(2) is overbroad and vacated the (a)(2) conviction; and set aside the remaining plea-based convictions because key plea terms became unfulfillable.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Anderson's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence was sufficient to convict under § 14-208.18(a)(1) (on the premises of a place intended primarily for minors) | Parking lot area was sufficiently part of the daycare "premises" for (a)(1) enforcement | Shared parking lot served multiple businesses and was not the daycare’s premises; State failed to prove defendant knowingly was on the daycare premises | Reversed: evidence insufficient to prove defendant was on the daycare "premises" under (a)(1) |
| Whether § 14-208.18(a)(2) (300-foot buffer for mixed-use property) is constitutionally valid | State defended statute but did not oppose federal courts' rulings on appeal | Anderson argued (a)(2) was unconstitutional as applied / in light of federal rulings | Vacated: Fourth Circuit and district court held (a)(2) unconstitutionally overbroad; Court adopted that analysis and vacated conviction |
| Whether appellate court should grant certiorari to review plea-based convictions tied to (a)(2) | State did not oppose certiorari; moved to file substitute brief acknowledging Doe decisions | Anderson sought certiorari because plea convictions rely in part on now-invalid statute | Certiorari granted under Appellate Rule 2 to prevent manifest injustice; State’s motion to substitute brief granted |
| Whether the plea agreement must be set aside if one conviction is vacated or reversed | State relied on negotiated global disposition | Anderson argued the plea depended on convictions including the now-vacated (a)(2) count, making essential terms unfulfillable | Set aside plea: because a pivotal conviction was vacated, essential plea terms were unfulfillable and the entire plea agreement was vacated and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Doe v. Cooper, 842 F.3d 833 (4th Cir. 2016) (affirming district court and holding § 14-208.18(a)(2) unconstitutionally overbroad)
- Does v. Cooper, 148 F. Supp. 3d 477 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (analyzing distinctions among subsections of § 14-208.18 and finding (a)(2) overbroad in violation of the First Amendment)
- State v. Rico, 218 N.C. App. 109 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing that when essential plea terms become unfulfillable, the plea agreement must be set aside)