State v. Anderson
2016 Ohio 7044
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Defendant Marlo Anderson pleaded guilty to robbery, abduction, and fifth-degree identity fraud for a gunpoint robbery and ATM withdrawals using the victim’s card/PIN.
- Trial court sentenced Anderson to an aggregate three-year prison term for robbery (including a firearm spec) and, on the identity-fraud count, imposed two years of community-control (including confinement in a community-based correctional facility—CBCF) to run consecutively to the prison term, plus mandatory postrelease control.
- Appellate panel identified an intradistrict conflict over whether a trial court may impose community-control sanctions on one felony to commence after a consecutive prison term on another felony. The court reheard the matter en banc.
- The majority concluded residential community-control confinement (CBCF) is a “sentence of imprisonment” and that Ohio law does not authorize residential or nonresidential community-control sanctions to be served consecutively to a prison term on a separate count (except limited statutory exceptions).
- Result: the CBCF/community-control sentence on the identity-fraud count was vacated as void; robbery and abduction convictions and prison terms were affirmed; remanded for resentencing on the identity-theft count only.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court may impose community-control sanctions (residential or nonresidential) on one felony to be served consecutively to a prison term for another felony | State argued no specific statutory prohibition bars such sentencing and past precedent allowed it | Anderson argued the court lacked statutory authority to order community-control sanctions to run consecutively to a separate count’s prison term | Held: No. Absent an express statutory exception, residential CBCF confinement is a "sentence of imprisonment" that must run concurrent under R.C. 2929.41(A); nonresidential sanctions likewise lack statutory authority to run consecutively to a separate prison term, so the consecutive community-control order is void. |
| Whether Barnhouse and related precedent preclude consecutive residential sanctions | State relied on some precedents permitting consecutive community-control terms | Defendant relied on Barnhouse and later Supreme Court precedent emphasizing sentencing must be authorized by statute | Held: Barnhouse (and State v. Anderson) limit sentencing; previous appellate decisions permitting consecutive community-control sanctions are overruled to the extent they conflict. |
| Whether R.C. 2951.07 or similar execution statutes authorize imposing community control to begin after prison | State argued execution provisions show community control can resume after confinement | Defendant argued those statutes govern execution, not the initial imposition of consecutive sanctions | Held: R.C. 2951.07 governs execution and cannot be read to create a general grant of authority that would render the specific statutory exception (e.g., R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) for some OVI felonies) superfluous. |
| Remedy when a court lacks statutory authority for a sentence component | State urged deference to sentencing discretion or correction in entry | Defendant sought vacatur of the improper component | Held: The unauthorized community-control component is void and must be vacated; remand for resentencing on that count only. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Anderson, 143 Ohio St.3d 173 (2015) (sentencing limited to what legislature authorizes; trial court may not impose sentences not provided by statute)
- State v. Barnhouse, 102 Ohio St.3d 221 (2004) (residential community-control confinement constitutes a sentence of imprisonment; consecutive jail sentences not permitted)
- State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 (2015) (merger analysis: offenses may be separately punished if dissimilar import, separately committed, or committed with separate animus)