State v. Anderson, 158 Conn.App. 315

Background

At ~2 a.m., Milford police officer Jason Anderson drove his cruiser at very high speed and collided with a Mazda driven by David Servin; both passengers (Servin and Ashlie Krakowski) died. Anderson was charged with two counts of manslaughter in the second degree (counts 1 and 2) and reckless driving (count 3).
The jury was instructed on manslaughter and lesser included offenses (misconduct with a motor vehicle; negligent homicide) and on intervening cause as a defense to proximate cause; the defendant submitted a yes/no interrogatory asking whether Servin’s conduct constituted an intervening cause.
The jury initially returned a verdict sheet and the interrogatory: it acquitted on manslaughter (counts 1 & 2), answered the interrogatory in court as indicating an intervening cause, but nonetheless (as announced) returned guilty verdicts on lesser included offenses for counts 1 and 2 and guilty on count 3 (reckless driving).
After receiving the interrogatory answer, the trial court perceived a legal inconsistency, vacated its acceptance of the verdicts, reinstructed the jury (focusing on intervening cause and the effect of a “yes” answer), and sent the jury back to deliberate; the jury later returned a consistent set of verdicts (guilty on the lesser included offenses for counts 1 & 2 and on count 3).
Anderson moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing (inter alia) that the jury’s initial interrogatory answer amounted to an acquittal barred by double jeopardy and that the court’s reinstruction coerced or misled the jury; the court denied relief.
On appeal, the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed in part and reversed in part: it held the court erred in vacating the jury’s not‑guilty verdicts and in its supplemental instructions (requiring a new trial on certain lesser included offenses and directing acquittal on one repeated lesser offense), but affirmed the conviction on reckless driving.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Anderson)	Held
1) Did the jury’s interrogatory answer (that Servin was an intervening cause) constitute an acquittal requiring directed judgment of acquittal on counts 1 & 2?	The interrogatory was ambiguous and not a unanimous factual resolution; it did not necessarily negate elements of the convictions, so no acquittal was required.	The interrogatory (a factual finding that Servin intervened) negated proximate cause and thus operated as an acquittal that should prevail over inconsistent guilty verdicts.	The court held the defendant did not meet his burden to show the interrogatory was a unanimous resolution of an essential element; therefore no acquittal was required.
2) Could the trial court vacate its acceptance of the initial verdicts (including the not‑guilty manslaughter verdicts) and send the jury back to deliberate?	The court was entitled to correct legally inconsistent verdicts before discharge and may ask jurors to clarify; Colon permits correction before discharge.	Vacating not‑guilty verdicts after acceptance invaded the jury’s final acquittal and violated double jeopardy.	The court erred to the extent it vacated the jury’s initial not‑guilty verdicts; those acquittals could not be undone. The Appellate Court directed acquittal on the lesser misconduct conviction in count 1.
3) Were the court’s supplemental instructions and procedures misleading or coercive (i.e., did they improperly pressure the jury to change answers)?	Instructions emphasized jury’s role and were proper reinstruction to resolve inconsistency.	The reinstructions unduly focused on changing the interrogatory, failed to explain unanimity requirement, and suggested the interrogatory had to match the verdicts, thereby misleading/coercing jurors.	The court’s supplemental instructions, viewed in totality, could reasonably have misled the jury; the state failed to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Error required a new trial for certain counts.
4) Remedy: If error, what relief is appropriate?	New trial on contested counts was appropriate if instructional error.	Directed judgment of acquittal on counts invalidated by the interrogatory/double jeopardy.	Because the interrogatory did not conclusively constitute an acquittal but the reinstruction was constitutionally flawed, the court ordered a new trial on specified lesser included offenses and directed acquittal on one previously returned lesser offense.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (establishes that an acquittal is a resolution of factual elements that cannot be reviewed without violating double jeopardy)
United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (inconsistent verdicts across counts are not necessarily reviewable; courts should not choose which verdict to "gore")
State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106 (trial court may correct/accept corrected jury verdicts before jury discharge under certain circumstances)
State v. Arroyo, 292 Conn. 558 (discusses treatment of inconsistent verdicts and limits on probing jury deliberations)
State v. Paolella, 210 Conn. 110 (acquittal defined as resolution of factual elements)
United States v. Mitchell, 476 F.3d 539 (8th Cir.) (holding defendant must show interrogatory reflected unanimous adverse factual finding; ambiguous interrogatory answers may not trigger double jeopardy)
United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (special findings that conclusively negate essential elements can preclude retrial; if impossible to tell on which ground jury convicted, conviction cannot stand)