State v. Anderson
138 Ohio St. 3d 264
| Ohio | 2014Background
- Victim Amber Zurcher was found strangled in June 2002; Christopher Anderson was later charged with her murder based on physical injuries, DNA consistent with Anderson in a breast contusion, and other circumstantial evidence.
- Anderson has undergone five prior trials over seven years (one conviction reversed on improperly admitted "bad-acts" evidence; multiple mistrials followed), was never lawfully convicted, and had been jailed for over a decade.
- The trial court set a sixth trial; Anderson moved to dismiss the indictment on double-jeopardy and due-process grounds. The trial court denied the motion.
- Anderson appealed the denial; the state moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the denial was not a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02.
- The Ohio Seventh District held the denial was a final, appealable order; the Supreme Court of Ohio granted review to decide whether denial of a double-jeopardy dismissal is a final, appealable order under the amended R.C. 2505.02.
- The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court: under the 1998 amendments to R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), denial of a double-jeopardy dismissal is a final, appealable order and remanded for merits review (the Court did not decide the due-process question).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Anderson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds is a "final, appealable order" under R.C. 2505.02 | Denial is interlocutory and not a final order; appeal should await final judgment | Denial effectively determines the prosecution and would not be meaningfully reviewable after retrial; immediate appeal is required to protect double-jeopardy rights | Held: Denial is a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) and appellate court has jurisdiction |
| Whether a motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds qualifies as a "provisional remedy" (R.C. 2505.02(A)(3)) | Not a provisional remedy; not listed in examples | It is ancillary to the prosecution and thus an ancillary proceeding/provisional remedy | Held: A double-jeopardy dismissal motion is a provisional remedy (ancillary proceeding) |
| Whether an order denying such a motion “in effect determines the action” with respect to the provisional remedy | Denial does not finally determine the action until trial concludes | Denial rejects the double-jeopardy claim and permits retrial, thus determining the action re: the remedy | Held: Denial does determine the action insofar as it permits or bars prosecution |
| Whether waiting until final judgment would afford a meaningful remedy | Post-conviction review is adequate | Waiting would force defendant to undergo retrial and defeat the constitutional protection against repeated trials | Held: Waiting would not provide a meaningful or effective remedy; interlocutory review is required to protect double-jeopardy rights |
Key Cases Cited
- Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (U.S. 1977) (federal constitutional basis for interlocutory review of double-jeopardy rulings to avoid "running the gauntlet")
- State v. Thomas, 61 Ohio St.2d 254 (Ohio 1980) (held denial of double-jeopardy motion was immediately appealable; overruled later by Crago)
- State v. Crago, 53 Ohio St.3d 243 (Ohio 1990) (held denial of double-jeopardy dismissal was not a final order under prior R.C. 2505.02; overruled by court here in light of statutory change)
- Wenzel v. Enright, 68 Ohio St.3d 63 (Ohio 1993) (applied Crago to limit pretrial review; criticized for not addressing Abney's constitutional concerns)
- State v. Muncie, 91 Ohio St.3d 440 (Ohio 2001) (discusses use of R.C. 2505.02 in determining final appealability in criminal cases)
- State v. Upshaw, 110 Ohio St.3d 189 (Ohio 2006) (explains 1998 amendments broadened the definition of "final order" under R.C. 2505.02)