State v. Ana M. Cruz, 109 A.3d 381

Officer Hardy entered defendant Ana M. Cruz’s backyard and home after a dispatch about an unsupervised, nearly-nude toddler near a lake; he observed unsafe conditions and sought the child’s mother.
A confrontation ensued between Hardy, Cruz, and a woman identified as Crystal Bretton; police arrested Cruz after a physical struggle.
Cruz was convicted in District Court of resisting arrest and disorderly conduct; she appealed and received a jury trial in Superior Court.
During jury selection in Superior Court Cruz (then represented) told counsel she wanted to represent herself; the trial justice conducted an extended on-the-record colloquy and ultimately permitted Cruz to proceed pro se after she refused standby counsel.
Cruz, who stated she could not read or write, proceeded pro se, was convicted by a jury of resisting arrest and disorderly conduct, and appealed claiming her Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because the court failed to secure a knowing and intelligent waiver.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed de novo whether Cruz’s waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent and affirmed the convictions, finding the colloquy and totality of circumstances sufficient and Chabot-factor analysis unnecessary absent competency concerns.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Cruz)	Held
Validity of waiver of counsel	Waiver was voluntary and Cruz appreciated risks; colloquy showed informed choice	Trial court failed to determine Cruz understood dangers/disadvantages of self-representation; she is illiterate and incompetent to waive	Waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; affirmed
Necessity of Chabot-factor inquiry	Not required because no facts suggested incompetence at time of waiver	Trial court should have applied Chabot factors given red flags and Cruz’s illiteracy and conduct	Chabot factors required only where competency is at issue; no competency indicators present, so not required
Relevance of pro se performance at trial	Poor performance does not retroactively invalidate waiver	Cruz’s trial performance and illiteracy show waiver was not knowing or competent	Competence to waive does not require competence to litigate; performance irrelevant to initial waiver validity
Adequacy of colloquy	Colloquy plus totality of circumstances was sufficient to inform Cruz of risks and alternatives	Colloquy was insufficiently probing given Cruz’s lack of literacy and expressed confusion	Colloquy was pragmatic and adequate; trial justice’s firsthand observation supported the ruling

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant has right to self-representation and must be made aware of dangers of self-representation)
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (competence to waive counsel equals competence to stand trial; no higher standard required)
State v. Chabot, 682 A.2d 1377 (R.I. 1996) (factors to assess waiver where competency is in question)
State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016 (R.I. 2002) (totality-of-circumstances approach to waiver; Chabot factors mandated only when competency is at issue)
State v. Laurence, 848 A.2d 238 (R.I. 2004) (analysis of voluntary waiver and interplay with Chabot factors)
State v. Bluitt, 850 A.2d 83 (R.I. 2004) (waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent)
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) (requirements for determining validity of waiver of counsel)
State v. Spencer, 783 A.2d 413 (R.I. 2001) (colloquy helpful but not constitutionally required; totality governs)
State v. Briggs, 787 A.2d 479 (R.I. 2001) (trial justice need not assess technical legal knowledge to accept waiver)