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State v. Amber Suzanne Hneidy
510 S.W.3d 458
Tex. App.
2013
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Background

  • Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio, Texas, applies to Amber S. Hneidy’s suppression motion from Kerr County trial court.
  • Officer Ben Eubank stopped Hneidy for allegedly failing to signal 100 feet before turning and was supported by Donnell’s observations.
  • Suppression hearing included Donnell and Eubank testimony, Eubank’s report, and a patrol-car video.
  • Trial court granted suppression, finding no reasonable suspicion and questioning the distance of signaling; it credited the video and stated several factual conclusions.
  • On appeal, the State argues the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion under the totality of circumstances; the appellate court must determine if the stop was reasonable under law and de novo review of law to facts.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Was the stop supported by reasonable suspicion? Hneidy State argues totality of circumstances suffices No; not supported by specific, articulable facts.
Did the trial court err by not considering all evidence or misapplying burden of proof? Hneidy challenged findings and evidentiary credit State asserts proper consideration and burden shifting No; reasonable-suspicion standard not met.
Did the officer have objective basis under totality of circumstances for stop despite video showing signaling before turning? Hneidy argues evidence insufficient State relies on 100-foot signaling rule No; lack of specific, articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion.

Key Cases Cited

  • Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (requires specific, articulable facts, not mere opinions, for reasonable suspicion)
  • Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citizen-eyewitness corroboration can support a stop without constituting a warrantless search)
  • Arizpe v. State, 308 S.W.3d 89 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010) (corroboration requirements for eyewitness information)
  • Garcia v. State, 327 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010) (reasonable-suspicion standard applied to totality of circumstances)
  • Elias v. State, 339 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (standard for reasonable suspicion; use of objective factors)
  • Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes reasonable-suspicion standard for detentions)
  • Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (need for corroboration beyond mere hunch in some contexts)
  • Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (objective review of facts supporting suspicion)
  • Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (standard for applying totality-of-circumstances analysis)
  • Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (deference to trial-court factual findings; de novo review of law)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Amber Suzanne Hneidy
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Jun 26, 2013
Citation: 510 S.W.3d 458
Docket Number: 04-12-00692-CR
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.