State v. Amaya
298 Neb. 70
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In 1999 Jay D. Amaya pled no contest to first-degree murder, use of a knife during a felony, and sexual assault; no direct appeal was taken.
- Amaya filed a postconviction motion in 2006 alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel; after an evidentiary hearing the district court denied relief and this Court affirmed.
- On September 2, 2016, Amaya filed a successive verified motion for postconviction relief alleging additional ineffective assistance claims and seeking a new trial; the motion acknowledged Nebraska’s 1-year statutory limitations period (§ 29-3001(4)).
- The district court dismissed the successive motion on September 7, 2016, without an evidentiary hearing or State response, finding it time barred, raising claims previously litigated or available earlier, and frivolous; the dismissal was with prejudice.
- Amaya’s later requests to amend the successive motion and to alter or amend judgment were denied as untimely or inappropriate; he appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Amaya) | Defendant's Argument (State / Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court could sua sponte dismiss a postconviction motion as time barred | Court should not dismiss sua sponte without State notice; procedural protections required | Court may perform preliminary review and may, but is not required to, decide timeliness sua sponte if motion+records show clear time bar | Held: Trial court may consider timeliness sua sponte during preliminary review and properly did so |
| Whether § 29-3001(4) 1‑year limit is an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to crimes before 2011 | Applying the 2011 statute to 1999 conviction is ex post facto punishment | Statutory time limits on collateral review are not among ex post facto categories and do not enhance punishment | Held: No ex post facto violation; statute applies to Amaya |
| Whether an "impediment created by state action" tolled the 1‑year limitations period under § 29-3001(4)(c) | Prior postconviction counsel’s ineffectiveness created a state-action impediment that prevented timely filing | Ineffective assistance in postconviction proceedings is not a constitutional right; Amaya did not show state action, a constitutional/state-law violation, or prevention from filing | Held: Tolling not available; Amaya failed to meet the statutory three-part test |
| Whether the court abused discretion by denying leave to amend and denying motion to alter or amend judgment | Amaya should be allowed to amend under rules of civil pleading and statutes | Postconviction practice does not permit amendment after court finds no need for evidentiary hearing; motion to alter was untimely under § 25-1329 | Held: No abuse of discretion; amendment properly denied and motion to alter was untimely |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Amaya, 276 Neb. 818, 758 N.W.2d 22 (affirming prior denial of Amaya’s 2006 postconviction claims)
- State v. Crawford, 291 Neb. 362, 865 N.W.2d 360 (statute of limitations is an affirmative defense; court noted sua sponte question left open)
- Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006) (federal courts may sua sponte consider timeliness of habeas petitions during preliminary review)
- State v. Robertson, 294 Neb. 29, 881 N.W.2d 864 (postconviction proceedings not governed by civil pleading rules; no amendment after court finds no hearing necessary)
- State v. Goynes, 293 Neb. 288, 876 N.W.2d 912 (application of § 29-3001(4) to successive motions)
- State v. Hessler, 288 Neb. 670, 850 N.W.2d 777 (principle that successive postconviction relief requires new grounds not existing at time of first motion)