State v. Amaya
298 Neb. 70
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Jay D. Amaya pled no contest in 1999 to first-degree murder, use of a knife, and sexual assault; no direct appeal was filed.
- Amaya filed a first postconviction motion in 2006 raising ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims; after an evidentiary hearing the district court denied relief and this Court affirmed.
- In September 2016 Amaya filed a successive verified postconviction motion alleging (1) trial counsel withheld evidence and misadvised him about death-penalty exposure, and (2) his earlier postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to raise those claims. He also sought a new-trial motion.
- The district court dismissed the successive motion sua sponte as time barred under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(4), concluded the claims were previously litigated or were available earlier, and called the motion frivolous; no hearing or State response was requested.
- Amaya moved to amend the successive motion and to alter or amend the judgment; the court denied amendment (because the case already was dismissed) and denied the motion to alter as untimely under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1329. He appealed pro se.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Amaya) | Defendant's Argument (State / Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court could sua sponte dismiss a postconviction motion as time barred | Court should not dismiss for statute of limitations without State notice; dismissal without hearing improper | Court may, as part of preliminary review, consider timeliness sua sponte if record/motion plainly show time bar | Allowed: trial courts may sua sponte decide timeliness when review shows motion is time barred |
| Whether § 29-3001(4) 1-year limitation is ex post facto when applied to crimes before 2011 | Applying the 2011 one-year limit to Amaya’s 1999 conviction is ex post facto punishment | Statutory time limit does not create or increase criminal punishment and is not an ex post facto law | Rejected Amaya’s ex post facto claim; statute is not ex post facto |
| Whether ineffective assistance of prior postconviction counsel tolls the 1-year limitation under § 29-3001(4)(c) | Prior postconviction counsel’s failings are an impediment created by state action that prevented filing earlier | There is no constitutional right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel; alleged facts do not show state-created impediment or constitutional violation | Tolling rejected; Amaya failed to satisfy § 29-3001(4)(c) requirements |
| Whether district court abused discretion by denying leave to amend or by denying motion to alter/amend judgment | Amaya should have been allowed to amend under civil pleading rules and Mata; motion to alter should have been considered | Postconviction proceedings are not governed by civil pleading rules for amendment after court finds no need for a hearing; motion to alter was untimely under § 25-1329 | No abuse of discretion: amendment denied properly; motion to alter denied as untimely |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Amaya, 276 Neb. 818, 758 N.W.2d 22 (Neb. 2008) (prior direct appellate/postconviction history)
- State v. Crawford, 291 Neb. 362, 865 N.W.2d 360 (Neb. 2015) (statute of limitations treated as affirmative defense; court noted sua sponte issue question)
- State v. Goynes, 293 Neb. 288, 876 N.W.2d 912 (Neb. 2016) (confirmation that § 29-3001(4) applies to verified motions, including successive ones)
- State v. Robertson, 294 Neb. 29, 881 N.W.2d 864 (Neb. 2016) (postconviction practice does not permit amendment after court determines no evidentiary hearing is necessary)
- Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (U.S. 2006) (federal courts may, but need not, consider timeliness sua sponte when preliminary review shows petition plainly time barred)