State v. Amaya, 298 Neb. 70

Background

In 1999 Jay D. Amaya pled no contest to first-degree murder, use of a knife in the commission of a felony, and sexual assault; no direct appeal was filed.
Amaya filed a postconviction motion in 2006 alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel; after an evidentiary hearing the district court denied relief and this Court affirmed.
On September 2, 2016, Amaya filed a successive verified motion for postconviction relief asserting additional ineffective-assistance claims and a motion for a new trial; the motion acknowledged Nebraska’s 1-year postconviction statute of limitations.
The district court dismissed the successive motion on September 7, 2016, without an evidentiary hearing or notice to the State, concluding the motion was time barred, raised claims previously litigated or available earlier, and was frivolous.
Amaya unsuccessfully sought leave to amend and moved to alter or amend the judgment; the district court denied amendment as moot and denied the Rule 59-type motion as untimely under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1329.
Amaya appealed, arguing the court erred by dismissing without notice/hearing, by denying amendment and reargument, and by denying appointment of postconviction counsel.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Amaya)	Defendant's Argument (State / Court reasoning)	Held
Whether court may dismiss a postconviction motion sua sponte as time barred	Court may not dismiss without notice/hearing; State waived timeliness defense earlier	Trial court may perform preliminary review and may sua sponte dismiss if motion and files plainly show untimeliness	Court may, but is not required to, consider timeliness sua sponte; dismissal here was proper
Whether applying the 2011 1-year limitations provision is an ex post facto law	Applying § 29-3001(4) to crimes committed before 2011 punishes retroactively	Statutory time limits on collateral review are not ex post facto punishments	Statute does not violate ex post facto clause; claim rejected
Whether § 29-3001(4)(c) tolls the limitation period due to prior postconviction counsel’s ineffective assistance	Prior postconviction counsel’s failures constituted a state-created impediment that tolled the limitations period	Tolling requires (1) state-created impediment, (2) constitutional/state-law violation, and (3) prevention from filing; ineffective postconviction counsel is not a constitutional violation and Amaya showed no prevention	Tolling not available; Amaya failed to meet the statutory three-part test; motion time barred
Whether court abused discretion by denying leave to amend and denying motion to alter judgment	Amaya should have been allowed to amend under civil pleading rules and have the dismissal altered	Postconviction proceedings are not governed by civil pleading rules; amendments after court finds no need for an evidentiary hearing are not contemplated; motion to alter was untimely under § 25-1329	No abuse of discretion; amendment properly denied and motion to alter was untimely

Key Cases Cited

State v. Amaya, 276 Neb. 818, 758 N.W.2d 22 (2008) (prior appeal affirming denial of Amaya’s earlier postconviction relief)
State v. Crawford, 291 Neb. 362, 865 N.W.2d 360 (2015) (statute of limitations for postconviction relief is an affirmative defense, not jurisdictional)
Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006) (federal courts may sua sponte consider timeliness of habeas petitions during preliminary review)
State v. Robertson, 294 Neb. 29, 881 N.W.2d 864 (2016) (postconviction statutes do not contemplate amendment of a motion after court finds no hearing necessary)
State v. Hessler, 288 Neb. 670, 850 N.W.2d 777 (2014) (limits on successive postconviction motions; grounds must not have existed at time of prior motion)