State v. Alonzo, 261 N.C. App. 51

Background

Defendant Edward M. Alonzo was tried for taking indecent liberties with a child and felonious child abuse for sexual misconduct against his daughter Sandy that began when she was four and continued while the family lived in Fayetteville (circa 1990–1993).
Sandy reported the abuse after reaching adulthood; a grand jury indicted Alonzo in 2017 for indecent liberties, felonious child abuse (sexual act), and first‑degree statutory sexual offense.
At trial the jury convicted Alonzo of indecent liberties and felonious child abuse, acquitted him of first‑degree statutory sexual offense, and the court instructed the jury using Pattern Jury Instruction N.C.P.I.–Crim. 239.55B for felonious child abuse.
Alonzo sought to testify that his compassionate leave was prompted by a separate sexual assault of another daughter by a neighbor; the trial court excluded that testimony under Rules 401 and 403 (relevance and prejudice/ confusion).
On appeal Alonzo argued (1) the Pattern Instruction’s definition of “sexual act” conflicts with controlling precedent and constituted plain error, and (2) the exclusion of his testimony was erroneous.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Alonzo's Argument	Held
Whether giving the Pattern Jury Instruction N.C.P.I.–Crim. 239.55B (definition of “sexual act”)—which differs from prior N.C. Court of Appeals interpretation—constituted reversible plain error when not objected to at trial	Pattern instruction is proper and preferred; no contemporaneous objection so review is for plain error; even if wording differs, Alonzo cannot show the jury probably would have reached a different result	The Pattern Instruction’s definition is broader than the Court of Appeals’ controlling interpretation (Lark) and thus inaccurate; the mismatch prejudiced the jury and requires reversal	No plain error. Court notes the Pattern instruction conflicts with binding precedent (Lark) and should be revised, but Alonzo failed to show the jury probably would have reached a different verdict absent the instruction.
Whether exclusion of Alonzo’s testimony about a separate sexual assault of another daughter (to show Alonzo would not have molested Sandy or to impeach the mother) was erroneous under Rules 401/403	Exclusion was proper: the testimony lacked a logical tendency to prove Alonzo innocent or to impeach reliably; any marginal relevance was substantially outweighed by risk of confusion and prejudice	Testimony was relevant and admissible: it would show motive for not offending during compassionate leave and impeach the mother’s credibility for reporting a neighbor but not her husband	No error. Trial court’s Rule 401 relevancy ruling was entitled to deference; even if marginally relevant, exclusion under Rule 403 was not an abuse of discretion because probative value was substantially outweighed by risk of confusion and prejudice.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506 (plain error standard for unpreserved jury‑instruction claims)
State v. Jordan, 333 N.C. 431 (appellate plain‑error review requires showing the jury probably would have reached a different result)
State v. Lark, 198 N.C. App. 82 (definition of “sexual act” applied to N.C.G.S. § 14‑318.4(a2))
State v. McClamb, 234 N.C. App. 753 (court declined to extend § 14‑27.1(4) definition to § 14‑318.4(a2) — noted conflict with Lark)
State v. Mumford, 364 N.C. 394 (treatment of inconsistent jury verdicts; not necessarily reversible)
State v. Farlow, 336 N.C. 534 (charges of indecent liberties and first‑degree sexual offense are not mutually exclusive)
State v. Griffin, 136 N.C. App. 531 (relevance standard: logical tendency to prove a fact of consequence)
State v. Whaley, 362 N.C. 156 (Rule 403 abuse‑of‑discretion review)
White v. White, 312 N.C. 770 (abuse of discretion defined)
Dunn v. Custer, 162 N.C. App. 259 (deference to trial court on Rule 401 rulings)