State v. Alonzo, 373 N.C. 437

Defendant was indicted for taking indecent liberties, felony child abuse by sexual act (§ 14‑318.4(a2)), and first‑degree statutory sexual offense for repeated sexual abuse of his daughter in 1990–1993.
At trial the court instructed the jury on the felony child‑abuse count and defined “sexual act” as “an immoral, improper or indecent act … for the purpose of arousing, gratifying sexual desire,” language that mirrored the pattern jury instruction.
Jury convicted on indecent liberties and felony child abuse by sexual act, acquitted on first‑degree statutory sexual offense.
Court of Appeals held the trial court erred by not defining “sexual act” using the statutory definition in § 14‑27.1(4) (later § 14‑27.20(4)), but found no plain error and affirmed convictions.
The Supreme Court granted discretionary review, concluded the Article 7A/7B definitions in § 14‑27.1(4) were limited to that Article and not applicable to § 14‑318.4(a2) (Article 39), modified the Court of Appeals and affirmed the convictions; it therefore did not reach the plain‑error prejudice analysis.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Alonzo)	Held
Whether the trial court erred by failing to define “sexual act” under § 14‑27.1(4) when instructing on felony child abuse (§ 14‑318.4(a2))	Pattern instruction was proper; § 14‑27.1(4) definitions need not apply outside Article 7A/7B	§ 14‑27.1(4) was the controlling statutory definition of “sexual act” and should have been used	No error: § 14‑27.1(4) definitions are limited to Article 7A/7B and do not govern § 14‑318.4(a2) in Article 39
Whether the alleged instructional error amounted to plain error requiring relief	Any instructional imprecision did not produce prejudicial error; convictions should stand	The nonstatutory definition was erroneous and prejudicial under plain error review	Not reached: because Court held there was no error in using the pattern instruction, it did not assess plain‑error prejudice

State v. Lark, 198 N.C. App. 82, 678 S.E.2d 693 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (Court of Appeals decision applying § 14‑27.1(4) definition to § 14‑318.4(a2))
State v. McClamb, 234 N.C. App. 753, 760 S.E.2d 337 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (Court of Appeals decision declining to extend § 14‑27.1(4) definition to § 14‑318.4(a2))
State v. Lucas, 302 N.C. 342, 275 S.E.2d 433 (N.C. 1981) (discusses origins of § 14‑27.1(4) definitions tied to Article 7A sexual‑offense elements)
Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (N.C. 1990) (statutory construction principles: plain meaning and legislative intent)
Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 325 S.E.2d 469 (N.C. 1985) (technical terms in statutes presumed used with their technical meaning absent contrary legislative intent)
State v. Meadows, 371 N.C. 742, 821 S.E.2d 402 (N.C. 2018) (precedent on Court of Appeals' binding effect and appellate review)
State v. Melton, 371 N.C. 750, 821 S.E.2d 424 (N.C. 2018) (standard of review for Court of Appeals decisions)