372 P.3d 432
Kan. Ct. App.2016Background
- Trooper James Parr stopped Joseph Allen for not wearing a seatbelt, observed signs of intoxication, and asked Allen to exit for field sobriety tests. Allen admitted drinking an open beer in the vehicle.
- While Parr patted Allen down, Parr felt a hard object in Allen's front right pocket; Allen fled on foot. Parr radioed for backup and began searching Allen's truck for alcohol and to inventory prior to towing.
- Parr found a homemade "sand club," two scales (one with visible white powder residue), a leafy green substance on the floorboard, and a pipe with white powdery residue in a lunch box. KBI testing identified methamphetamine on the scale residue and inside the pipe; the scale residue also contained THC; the leafy material was marijuana.
- Allen was charged with multiple offenses including possession of methamphetamine; a jury convicted him of six charges (acquittal on criminal use of a weapon) and the court sentenced him to 20 months for methamphetamine possession. Allen appealed.
- On appeal Allen argued (1) insufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed the methamphetamine residue on the scale/pipe, and (2) the reasonable-doubt jury instruction (PIK Crim. 4th 51.010) improperly foreclosed jury nullification by using the word "should." The court reviewed sufficiency under the usual light-most-favorable standard and reviewed the instruction for clear error (no contemporaneous objection).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Allen) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence to prove knowing possession of methamphetamine | Visible residue on items in Allen's vehicle and proximity support a reasonable inference Allen knew of and controlled the drugs | Residue was de minimis/oversight; State failed to prove Allen knew about the small amount of residue | Affirmed: circumstantial evidence (visible residue on scale and pipe in Allen's vehicle) supports a rational jury finding of knowing possession |
| Jury reasonable-doubt instruction and jury nullification | PIK Crim. 4th 51.010 properly instructs jury; "should" is advisory and does not compel conviction | The instruction's use of "should" effectively directed a verdict, eliminating jury nullification | Affirmed: Instruction not legally inappropriate or clearly erroneous; "should" is advisory, unlike mandatory terms such as "must" or "will." |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Frye, 294 Kan. 364 (2012) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence conviction appeals)
- State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614 (2008) (circumstantial evidence may support conviction without excluding all other reasonable inferences)
- State v. McClanahan, 212 Kan. 208 (1973) (jury must apply law to evidence; courts should not instruct juries to nullify)
- State v. Naputi, 293 Kan. 55 (2011) (rejecting instructions that endorse jury nullification or permit jury to ignore law)
- State v. Smith-Parker, 301 Kan. 132 (2014) (instruction using mandatory phrasing can improperly direct a verdict and constitute error)
