State v. Alexander M. Schultz
939 N.W.2d 519
Wis.2020Background
- In 2012–2014 police investigated sexual activity between then‑15‑year‑old M.T. and Alexander Schultz; the initial complaint charged "repeated sexual assault of a child" occurring in "late summer to early fall of 2012."
- The complaint expressly incorporated Officer Waid's police report, which described intercourse between Schultz and M.T. beginning mid‑2012 and ending by early–mid September 2012 (M.T. reported intercourse with another male in early–mid October and that she had a period in between).
- Schultz was tried on the first complaint in January 2014; trial evidence and argument consistently placed the conduct in July–September 2012 and the jury acquitted him.
- Shortly after the acquittal, a paternity test showed Schultz was the father with an obstetrician’s estimated conception date of October 19, 2012; the State then charged Schultz with sexual assault of a child "on or about October 19, 2012."
- Schultz moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds; the trial court and court of appeals denied relief. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed: courts may examine the entire record of the first prosecution (including trial evidence and incorporated police reports) to determine the scope of jeopardy, and the record showed the first prosecution’s scope ended before October, so the second prosecution did not violate double jeopardy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Schultz) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a court may consider the entire record of the first prosecution (including trial evidence) to define the scope of jeopardy for double jeopardy purposes | Courts should examine the whole record to determine what factual exposure to jeopardy occurred | A reasonable‑person test should govern and the scope should be fixed by how the charging language would be understood at the time jeopardy attached (without using trial evidence to redefine it) | Held: courts may review the entire record (pleadings, incorporated reports, evidence, testimony, arguments) to define the actual scope of jeopardy |
| Whether the second prosecution ("on or about Oct. 19, 2012") charged the same offense in fact as the first ("late summer to early fall 2012") | The second prosecution charges conduct outside the timeframe actually shown by the record in the first case | The charging phrase "early fall" is broad enough to include Oct. 19; ambiguity should be construed against the State | Held: the incorporated police report and trial record confined the first prosecution to July–September; Oct. 19 was outside that scope, so no double jeopardy |
| Burden of ambiguity in a charging timeframe | The State may rely on the record; no separate burden‑shifting rule was required here | If the charging period is ambiguous, the ambiguity should be resolved against the State as drafter | Held: court decided issue on record‑review grounds and did not adopt a defendant‑favored burden‑shifting approach (no separate holding on proponent burden required) |
| Role of Wis. Stat. § 971.29 in conforming pleadings to proof | §971.29 permits pleadings to be treated as amended to conform to proof and supports examination of the record | N/A | Held: §971.29 supports considering trial proof to determine scope; post‑verdict amendment language contains no prejudice qualifier and courts should not read in omitted limits |
Key Cases Cited
- Van Meter v. State, 72 Wis. 2d 754 (1976) (scope of jeopardy inquiry may require review of the record; offenses identical in fact must be identical in law and fact)
- Anderson v. State, 221 Wis. 78 (1936) (test: if facts alleged under one indictment would warrant conviction under the other, prosecutions are for the same offense)
- George v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 92 (1975) (continuing‑offense treatment: conviction/acquittal for part of a continuing period can bar prosecution for the whole period)
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (elements test distinguishing offenses identical in law)
- United States v. Olmeda, 461 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2006) (proposed "reasonable person" test and burden‑shifting for conspiracy; declined by Wisconsin Supreme Court)
- United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1999) (examined trial evidence to conclude overlapping time frames did not produce double jeopardy)
- United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118 (3d Cir. 1985) (scope of double jeopardy bar determined by the conviction and the entire record supporting it)
- State v. Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244 (Ct. App. 1988) (recognizes flexible pleading in child abuse cases but demands rigorous double jeopardy protection for later prosecutions within same timeframe)
- State v. Hurley, 361 Wis. 2d 529 (2015) (charging periods in child sexual‑assault cases need not be date‑specific because of victims’ mnemonic limitations)