State v. Alexande r, SC20316

Background

On Jan. 20, 2014, Damarquis Gray shot and killed Durell Law during an attempted robbery; Joel Alexander was present and (according to witnesses) helped facilitate the robbery by possessing/passing a handgun and urging the group to “do it.”
Witnesses (Hall, Gomez, Cato) and surveillance video placed Alexander at the scene, in proximity to the victim, and briefly in possession of a firearm; these witnesses testified at trial and the three-judge panel and presiding judge found them credible.
Alexander was tried and convicted of felony murder, attempt to commit robbery (1st degree), conspiracy to commit robbery (1st degree), and carrying a pistol without a permit; the felony murder count was tried to a three-judge panel.
After arrest, Alexander gave a video-recorded statement in which he denied participating in the robbery/murder but admitted being at the scene and briefly holding another person’s gun; during the interview he made an ambiguous remark interpreted by the court as, “you got me … stop talking right now, I’m trying to get a lawyer.”
Pretrial, the court admitted the recording (finding the invocation unintelligible under Davis). After this court decided State v. Purcell (recognizing broader state-constitutional protection for equivocal requests for counsel), the trial court concluded the recorded remark was an equivocal invocation under Purcell and that subsequent questioning/statements should have been suppressed.
The trial court vacated Alexander’s conviction for carrying a pistol without a permit (because the presiding judge had relied on the confession-like admission) but denied a new trial for felony murder, attempt, and conspiracy, concluding any Purcell error was harmless. Alexander appealed.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Alexander's Argument	Held
Whether the ambiguous comment triggered Purcell protections requiring cessation of interrogation and suppression of subsequent statements	The state acknowledged the remark was ambiguous but argued any error was harmless; alternatively argued Alexander retracted the invocation	The remark was an equivocal request for counsel under Purcell, so further questioning and subsequent statements should have been suppressed	The court assumed a Purcell violation occurred but proceeded to harmless-error review (treating the recording as improperly admitted)
Whether the improper admission was harmless as to the felony murder conviction	The recording was cumulative, not relied on, and the panel credited other evidence; harmless beyond a reasonable doubt	The error tainted the entire proceeding, affected defense strategy, and could have foreclosed the §53a-54c affirmative defense	Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt — the panel and judge did not rely on Alexander’s statements; other evidence independently established guilt; the recording was cumulative
Whether the improper admission was harmless as to attempt and conspiracy convictions	Same: statements were cumulative and not relied on; harmless	Same: admitted statements affected trial and strategy	Harmless — presiding judge stated he did not consider the interview in finding guilt on those counts
Whether the pistol-possession conviction must be vacated because the judge relied on the post-invocation admission	The state argued harmless or no Purcell violation; alternatively the statement was cumulative	The admission was inculpatory and the judge relied on it to convict Alexander of carrying without a permit	Not harmless for that count — presiding judge explicitly relied on the interview admission; conviction vacated and a new trial ordered

Key Cases Cited

State v. Purcell, 331 Conn. 318 (Conn. 2019) (Connecticut rule: equivocal requests for counsel require cessation of interrogation except for narrow clarifying questions)
State v. Culbreath, 340 Conn. 167 (Conn. 2021) (harmless-error framework for constitutional evidentiary errors under Connecticut law)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (constitutional evidentiary errors are subject to harmless-error review requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1994) (federal standard: an unambiguous request for counsel is required to invoke Miranda protections)
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (U.S. 1991) (distinguishing structural error from trial error; involuntary confessions reviewed for harmlessness)
State v. Wilson, 308 Conn. 412 (Conn. 2013) (improperly admitted statements may be harmless when cumulative of properly admitted evidence)
State v. Smith, 289 Conn. 598 (Conn. 2008) (same: erroneous admission of statements evaluated under harmless-error principles)
United States v. Lee, 618 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2010) (bench-trial harmlessness where judge stated disputed evidence had no effect on decision)
United States v. Miller, 800 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1986) (bench-trial deference to trial judge’s statement that it disregarded disputed evidence)