443 P.3d 140
Idaho2019Background
- In August 2016, Captain Dan Kindig went to Darryl Albertson’s home to ask about a suspicious sulfur purchase; on a subsequent visit he walked up to Albertson’s porch and saw Albertson through a window smoking from what appeared to be a meth pipe.
- A faded “Private Property No Trespassing” sign had been posted on a power pole near the property entrance; the officer testified he did not notice the sign and photographs show the sign was small, dark, and difficult to read.
- Kindig knocked, Albertson answered, the officer seized the pipe, it tested positive for methamphetamine, and Albertson was charged with possession of a controlled substance and paraphernalia.
- Albertson moved to suppress, arguing the sign revoked the implied license to approach his home and the officer’s presence in the curtilage therefore amounted to an unconstitutional search; the district court denied the motion.
- Albertson entered a conditional (Alford) guilty plea reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling; the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a single no-trespassing sign can revoke the implied license to approach a home | State: implied license allows approach; no exception applies here because sign insufficient | Albertson: a posted no-trespassing sign revoked the implied license, making the officer’s presence a search | Court: need not decide single-sign rule broadly; here the particular sign was insufficient to revoke the implied license |
| Whether officer’s observation through the window was a Fourth Amendment/Idaho Const. search | State: officer was on area open to public and saw contraband in open view, so no search | Albertson: officer entered curtilage after license revoked, so observation was a warrantless search | Court: because implied license was not effectively revoked, officer was in a public-accessible location and observation was open view, not a search |
| Relevance of Idaho trespass statute to Fourth Amendment analysis | State: trespass law not determinative of constitutional privacy expectations | Albertson: legislative trespass provisions show a sign is sufficient to exclude visitors | Court: trespass law is not controlling for Fourth Amendment purposes; no constitutional nexus between trespass law and privacy analysis |
| Whether officer actually knew of the sign (subjective awareness) matters | State: objective test controls; actual notice would suffice to bar approach | Albertson: posting put officer on notice | Court: objective test applies; here officer lacked actual notice and sign would not objectively communicate exclusion to a reasonably respectful citizen |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Christensen, 131 Idaho 143 (Idaho 1996) (establishes test for revocation of implied license to approach a home)
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2013) (recognizes implied invitation to approach home to knock and limits on forensic use of curtilage approach)
- Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (U.S. 1984) (explains trespass law does not automatically define Fourth Amendment privacy interests)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (U.S. 1967) (foundational reasonable expectation of privacy principle)
- Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (U.S. 2001) (distinguishes uses of technology and privacy expectations)
- United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (U.S. 1987) (defines curtilage concept for Fourth Amendment analysis)