State v. Alberts, 924 N.W.2d 96

In 2008, James X. Alberts Jr. pled guilty to murder (Class AA) and was sentenced to 20 years with the balance suspended after seven years; the suspended portion was to be served on probation under Appendix A conditions.
In May 2013, probation conditions were amended to restrict contact with minors with limited exceptions and supervision requirements.
In October 2013 the State moved to revoke; after a hearing the court revoked probation, resentenced Alberts to life with 11 years to serve, credit for time served, and the remainder suspended for five years with Appendix A reimposed; the court orally stated the suspension would be "subject to supervised probation."
In December 2017 the State again moved to revoke Alberts’ probation for multiple alleged violations; following a hearing the court revoked probation and resentenced Alberts to life with the possibility of parole (order later amended to clarify release eligibility).
Alberts appealed, arguing the 2013 written resentencing did not expressly impose probation (or specify its length), so he was not on probation in 2018 and the court lacked authority to revoke and resentence him; he also asked the court to vacate the 2018 order in the interest of justice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court had authority to revoke Alberts’ probation in 2018	The State: Alberts was on probation because the 2013 oral sentence plainly suspended the remainder subject to supervised probation and the written order reimposed Appendix A conditions	Alberts: The 2013 written order did not explicitly state probation or its term, so no probation was imposed and the court lacked authority to revoke in 2018	Court: The unambiguous oral pronouncement plus written references to Appendix A and probation officer show intent to impose probation; Alberts was on probation and the court had authority to revoke
Whether resentencing to life with parole was improper and should be vacated in the interests of justice	The State: Resentencing after revocation may impose any sentence available at initial sentencing; life with possibility of parole was within statutory range and within court discretion	Alberts: The court wanted a less severe sentence but was constrained by statutory limits (cites Stavig); asks vacatur so court can impose an appropriate sentence	Court: Statute limited Alberts to two probationary periods (he had already served two), so a further probationary term was unavailable; resentencing to life with parole was within the statutory range and not an abuse of discretion

State v. Rath, 2017 ND 213, 901 N.W.2d 51 (when written and oral sentences conflict, oral controls if unambiguous; otherwise examine record for intent)
State v. Raulston, 2005 ND 212, 707 N.W.2d 464 (court intent controls where ambiguity exists between oral and written sentence)
State v. Stavig, 2006 ND 63, 711 N.W.2d 183 (interpretation that an additional period of probation means only one additional period; limits total periods)
State v. Perales, 2012 ND 158, 820 N.W.2d 119 (reinforces limit on total probationary periods after revocation)
State v. Lott, 2019 ND 18, 921 N.W.2d 428 (issue-preservation and obvious-error standard on appeal)