State v. Albarran
187 Wash. 2d 15
| Wash. | 2016Background
- In April 2013, Miguel Albarran was found by T.R.’s mother on the victim’s bed; DNA from the victim’s underwear and leg matched Albarran.
- Albarran was convicted by jury of second degree rape (RCW 9A.44.050(1)(b)) and second degree rape of a child (RCW 9A.44.076) arising from the same act.
- The State alleged a special aggravating factor on the second degree rape count that the victim was under 15, triggering a mandatory 25-year minimum under RCW 9.94A.837.
- At sentencing the parties agreed the simultaneous convictions violated double jeopardy; the trial court vacated the child-rape conviction as the “lesser” offense.
- Albarran argued the general-specific rule required vacating the more general second-degree-rape conviction instead; the Court of Appeals agreed and vacated the second-degree-rape conviction and reinstated the child-rape conviction.
- The Washington Supreme Court granted review and reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstating the trial court’s judgment and sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Albarran's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether double jeopardy bars convictions for both second-degree rape and second-degree child rape based on the same act | Double jeopardy bars both; remedy should reflect general-specific rule (vacate general rape) | Double jeopardy bars both; remedy is vacation of the lesser offense (vacate child-rape here) | Double jeopardy applies; remedy is vacation of the lesser offense per Hughes; but case turned on general-specific question below |
| Whether the general-specific rule applies to bar prosecution/conviction under the more general second-degree-rape statute when child-rape statute also applies | General-specific rule requires vacating the more general second-degree-rape conviction | General-specific rule does not apply because the legislature authorized charging second-degree rape when victim is under 15 (special enhancement) | General-specific rule does not bar prosecution/conviction under second-degree rape here; court rejects Albarran’s concurrency argument |
| Whether RCW 9.94A.837(1) (special allegation for victims under 15) shows legislative intent to permit charging second-degree rape even when victim is a child | Albarran: enhancement could be limited to other means of committing second-degree rape | State: enhancement applies to any second-degree rape prosecution; shows legislature intended both charging options | Court finds enhancement unambiguous evidence that legislature meant to allow second-degree-rape prosecutions when victim is under 15 |
| Proper remedy for the double jeopardy violation in this case after resolving general-specific question | Vacate second-degree-rape conviction (general) | Vacate second-degree-child-rape conviction (lesser sentence) | Because the general-specific rule does not displace the prosecution-enhancement scheme, Court of Appeals erred; reinstate judgment and sentence (trial court’s vacation of child-rape conviction stands) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hughes, 166 Wn.2d 675 (discusses double jeopardy for rape and child-rape arising from same act)
- State v. Shriner, 101 Wn.2d 576 (explains Washington’s general-specific rule and concurrency concept)
- State v. Conte, 159 Wn.2d 797 (discusses application of general-specific doctrine)
- State v. Weber, 159 Wn.2d 252 (describes remedy for double jeopardy: vacate lesser offense)
- State v. Cann, 92 Wn.2d 193 (general rule on special vs general statutes)
- State v. Danforth, 97 Wn.2d 255 (general-specific rule background)
- State v. Walls, 81 Wn.2d 618 (general-specific rule background)
- Henne v. City of Yakima, 182 Wn.2d 447 (statutory interpretation principles: plain language controls)