State v. Aguirre (Slip Opinion)
144 Ohio St. 3d 179
| Ohio | 2014Background
- In 2002 Sharlene Aguirre pleaded guilty to a fourth-degree felony (theft) and was sentenced to five years community control plus restitution: $2,000 to her employer and $32,562.47 to two third-party insurers; she paid some but still owed over $14,000.
- Aguirre completed community control in June 2007 but did not finish paying restitution.
- In January 2012 Aguirre applied to have her conviction record sealed under R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) (application permitted three years after offender’s “final discharge”).
- The trial court granted sealing despite unpaid restitution to insurers; the Tenth District affirmed, reasoning sealing could be allowed and creditors retain collection remedies.
- The Tenth District certified conflict with the Eighth District (McKenney) which had held final discharge requires full payment of restitution.
- The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Tenth District: it held an offender is not finally discharged for R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) purposes until all court-ordered restitution is paid, so Aguirre was ineligible to seek sealing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an offender may have felony conviction sealed when unpaid court-ordered restitution to third-party insurers remains | Aguirre: sealing may be granted despite unpaid insurer restitution; sealing is remedial and public-interest weighing can justify it; creditors keep collection remedies | State: applicant not eligible until final discharge; unpaid restitution prevents final discharge and the statutory 3-year waiting period from beginning | Court held: applicant not eligible; final discharge requires satisfaction of all sentencing requirements including full restitution, so sealing denied |
| Whether identity of restitution payee (victim vs insurer) matters to final-discharge inquiry | Aguirre: insurer payee should not bar sealing; interest in rehabilitation and remedial nature of sealing support flexibility | State: payee identity is immaterial if restitution order was lawful at sentencing; when ordered, insurer restitution is part of sentence and must be completed | Court held: payee identity immaterial; if restitution to third party was legally ordered at sentencing (pre-2004 permissible), it must be completed before final discharge is reached |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Boykin, 138 Ohio St.3d 97 (2013) (sealing is a statutory privilege, not a right; courts may seal only when eligibility requirements are met)
- State v. Futrall, 123 Ohio St.3d 498 (2009) (court may seal only after statutory eligibility conditions are satisfied)
- State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Lyons, 140 Ohio St.3d 7 (2014) (discusses sealing as a privilege and standards for relief)
- State v. Pettis, 133 Ohio App.3d 618 (1999) (an offender is not finally discharged until the sentence imposed has been served)
- In re White, 165 Ohio App.3d 288 (2006) (applicant not finally discharged for sealing purposes while restitution remains unpaid)
- Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (restitution has both remedial and punitive aspects)
