State v. Aguirre, 301 Kan. 950

Background

Aguirre was convicted of capital murder for the deaths of his ex-girlfriend Tanya and their 1‑year‑old son; he received life without parole after the jury declined death.
Detectives from Riley County interrogated Aguirre twice after discovering the victims’ bodies; he initially waived Miranda rights in writing and orally, then made inculpatory statements in both interviews.
During the first interview, after attempting to end questioning to take a child to family, Aguirre said, “I’m going to take my rights,” but detectives continued to question him and obtained further statements; he later made additional admissions in a second interview.
The district court denied Aguirre’s motion to suppress those post‑invocation statements; at trial the State introduced video recordings of both interrogations and e‑mails sent by Aguirre after the deaths.
On appeal the Kansas Supreme Court held the phrase “I’m going to take my rights,” read in context and against the written Miranda waiver language used, was an unambiguous invocation that detectives were required to honor; all post‑invocation statements from the first interview (and those tainted in the second) should have been suppressed.
Because the State could not show beyond a reasonable doubt that admission of the tainted confessions was harmless in light of the overall record, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Issues

Issue	Aguirre's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether Aguirre unambiguously invoked his Miranda right to cut off questioning during the first interview	Aguirre argued his statement “I’m going to take my rights” (made after reading a Miranda form and after saying he wanted to leave to turn in a child) was an unambiguous invocation requiring cessation	State said the phrase was ambiguous in context (he equivocated with “I guess,” expressed willingness to help later, and cited child‑care reasons), so detectives could seek clarification and continue	Court held the invocation was unambiguous given the written waiver language and context; detectives should have stopped; post‑invocation statements from the first interview must be suppressed
Whether the second interrogation’s waiver cured the earlier Miranda violation or whether later statements were tainted	Aguirre argued the second interview was tainted because police had unlawfully continued questioning after his invocation, so any subsequent waiver was invalid	State argued second‑interview admissions were voluntary and would render the first error harmless	Court held the second interview was tainted under Matson two‑part test (police reinitiated questioning and did not obtain a valid waiver), so those statements should also be suppressed
Whether admission of the tainted confessions was harmless error	Aguirre argued the confessions were central and their admission likely affected the verdict	State argued circumstantial evidence might suffice and error was harmless	Court found the State failed to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt and reversed for a new trial
Need to address voluntariness or prosecutorial closing‑argument errors	Aguirre also raised involuntariness and prosecutor misconduct claims	State defended trial rulings on those matters	Court declined to reach those claims because suppression/reversal on Miranda grounds disposed of the case

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warnings and right to cut off questioning)
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (post‑invocation questioning requires that right to cut off be scrupulously honored)
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (invocation must be unambiguous; objective test)
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984) (postrequest responses cannot retroactively render an earlier invocation ambiguous)
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (harmless‑error framework for coerced/confession error)
United States v. Rambo, 365 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 2004) (suppression where police continued after invocation)
State v. Matson, 260 Kan. 366 (1996) (two‑part test for waiver after prior invocation: accused initiated further discussion and knowingly waived prior right)
State v. Swanigan, 279 Kan. 18 (2005) (taint from earlier coercion can affect subsequent statements)
State v. Cline, 295 Kan. 104 (2012) (objective reasonable‑officer test for clarity of invocation)