State v. Aguirre, 313 Kan. 189

Background

In 2009 the bodies of T.M. (mother) and her one‑year‑old son J.M. were found in a shallow grave in Osage County, Kansas; Luis Antonio Aguirre was later charged with capital murder for both deaths.
This is a retrial after this Court in State v. Aguirre, 301 Kan. 950 (2015) (Aguirre I) reversed the earlier conviction based on a Miranda issue.
At retrial the State presented: (a) Aguirre’s post‑invocation statements to police (admitted for impeachment), (b) email communications between Aguirre and T.M. (the parties had stipulated to authenticity at the first trial), and (c) botanical expert testimony from Dr. Andrew Tomb that the grave had been open for a nontrivial period before internment (the “open grave” opinion).
Defense challenged voluntariness of statements, admissibility/reliability of Dr. Tomb’s open‑grave opinion under Kansas’s post‑2014 Daubert framework (K.S.A. 60‑456(b)), and enforcement of the prior stipulation to emails; defense also sought a cautionary instruction against inference‑stacking and alleged prosecutorial error.
Jury convicted Aguirre of voluntary manslaughter for T.M. and first‑degree premeditated murder for J.M.; Aguirre appealed raising the issues above.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Aguirre)	Held
Voluntariness of post‑invocation statements (impeachment use)	Statements were voluntary under totality of circumstances and admissible for impeachment.	Post‑invocation questioning rendered statements involuntary (coercive police conduct).	Court: statements were voluntary; even if first interview problematic, overall voluntariness found and second interview voluntary. (Concurring justice would have found first involuntary but harmless.)
Admissibility of Dr. Tomb’s “open grave” expert opinion (gatekeeper/Daubert)	Tomb was a qualified botanist; his observations could support an opinion about leaves and a minimum open period.	Opinion was unreliable "junk science"; methodology and data insufficient to support time‑interval conclusion.	Court: district court performed gatekeeping and used correct standard, but abused discretion in admitting the specific open‑grave time‑lapse opinion as unreliable; allowed testimony on vegetation condition but not its definitive temporal conclusion. Error found but harmless.
Sufficiency of evidence / premeditation & inference‑stacking	Multiple circumstantial facts (forensic opinion of homicide, witness statements, emails, secret remote burial, victim’s infancy) independently support premeditation without stacking.	Conviction depends on stacked inferences (including open‑grave timing); insufficient direct evidence of identity, manner, timing.	Court: evidence sufficient; no impermissible inference‑stacking required to support premeditated murder verdict for J.M.
Enforceability of prior stipulation to email authenticity	The written stipulation was not expressly limited to the first trial; stipulations of foundational facts are generally binding on retrial and State relied on it.	Stipulation applied only to the first trial ("the jury trial") and should not bind a retrial.	Court: stipulation ambiguous but not limited to one trial; enforcing it was not an abuse of discretion. Emails admitted.
Denial of requested inference‑stacking jury instruction	State: instruction unnecessary and might mislead jurors about application.	Needed to prevent conviction based on stacked inferences drawn from other inferences.	Court: instruction legally correct but not factually appropriate here (no real danger jury stacked inferences); refusal harmless.
Prosecutorial closing argument (unanimity, burden dilution)	Closing was within allowable latitude; metaphor urged jurors to synthesize evidence.	Prosecutor misstated unanimity requirement and diluted reasonable‑doubt burden.	Court: no prosecutorial error—context shows no suggestion jurors could convict without unanimous agreement on elements or lower burden.
Jurisdiction to convict of two lesser included offenses from one capital count	State: charging document and precedent permit conviction of multiple lesser counts when capital count alleges multiple killings.	Convicting on two lesser included crimes exceeds statutory language allowing conviction of the crime charged or a lesser included crime.	Court: no jurisdictional defect; follows State v. Martis — multiple lesser convictions allowed when capital count alleges multiple killings.

Key Cases Cited

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1993) (federal framework for admissibility of expert scientific testimony adopted into Kansas law)
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (U.S. 1999) (Daubert gatekeeping applies to non‑scientific expert testimony; experience‑based reliability considerations)
State v. Aguirre, 301 Kan. 950 (Kan. 2015) (Aguirre I) (previous reversal based on Miranda issue; background for retrial)
State v. Lyman, 311 Kan. 1 (Kan. 2020) (discusses post‑2014 K.S.A. 60‑456(b) Daubert factors in Kansas)
State v. Swindler, 296 Kan. 670 (Kan. 2013) (interrogation tactics where continued questioning after asserted right rendered statements involuntary)
State v. Martis, 277 Kan. 267 (Kan. 2004) (multiple lesser included convictions allowed when capital charge alleges killing of more than one person)
State v. Banks, 306 Kan. 854 (Kan. 2017) (discussion of permissible inferences and prohibition on inference‑stacking in proving premeditation)