State v. Aguado
387 Mont. 1
| Mont. | 2017Background
- Denis Aguado (defendant) lived with Patricia and her granddaughter A.M.; A.M. alleged repeated sexual abuse by Aguado beginning in childhood.
- A recorded telephone call (when A.M. was 13) and a written "sex contract" were turned over to police; Aguado was charged with Sexual Abuse of Children and Sexual Assault.
- First jury found Aguado guilty of Sexual Abuse of Children and hung on Sexual Assault; second trial convicted him of Sexual Assault.
- Aguado moved twice to substitute his public defender, alleging conflicts, withheld discovery, and ineffective assistance; the district court denied both motions after hearings.
- District court excluded evidence about A.M.’s broader sexual history and orientation under Montana’s Rape Shield statute but allowed other contextual testimony; a juror was later excused for nondisclosure; a standard unanimity instruction was given.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Substitution of counsel | Aguado argued counsel had conflicts, withheld documents, and communication had broken down requiring new counsel | State argued Aguado failed to show an actual conflict or ineffective assistance; court had discretion | Denial affirmed: court conducted adequate inquiry and complaints were not "seemingly substantial" |
| 2. Rape-shield exclusion & confrontation rights | Aguado sought to admit evidence of A.M.’s bisexuality and sexual plans to contextualize the recorded call | State argued such evidence is barred by § 45-5-511(2) and would improperly attack the victim’s character | Affirmed: exclusion was within discretion; proffered evidence was speculative and prejudicial; sufficient contextual evidence was allowed |
| 3. Removal of Juror No. 5 | Aguado argued juror was forthright and removal was unnecessary; State argued juror failed to disclose son’s sexual-conduct conviction | State asserted it would have used a peremptory strike had it known | Affirmed: court reasonably excused juror for nondisclosure and seated alternate; no abuse of discretion |
| 4. Unanimity instruction | Aguado argued a more specific instruction was required because multiple incidents were alleged | State argued incidents were closely connected or continuous; standard instruction sufficed | Affirmed: pattern unanimity instruction was adequate given the facts and court’s discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Cheetham, 373 P.3d 45 (Mont. 2016) (standard for substitution inquiry and adequacy of district court’s inquiry)
- State v. Colburn, 366 P.3d 258 (Mont. 2016) (review of statutory interpretation and balancing Rape Shield against confrontation rights)
- State v. Grindheim, 101 P.3d 267 (Mont. 2004) (discretion to remove a juror when ability to perform duties impaired)
- State v. Dunfee, 114 P.3d 217 (Mont. 2005) (standard for reviewing jury instructions as a whole)
- State v. Weaver, 964 P.2d 713 (Mont. 1998) (when unanimity instructions are required for multiple allegations)
- State v. Harris, 36 P.3d 372 (Mont. 2001) (continuous-offense doctrine affecting unanimity requirement)
- In re Gillham, 704 P.2d 1019 (Mont. 1985) (permitting counsel to respond in postconviction proceedings without disciplinary exposure)
- United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (limitations on a defendant’s right to present evidence when rules serve compelling interests)
