State v. Agboghidi
1 CA-CR 15-0123-PRPC
| Ariz. Ct. App. | Sep 26, 2017Background
- In 2004, Darius Agboghidi (age 16) pled guilty to first-degree murder and first-degree burglary and was sentenced to life with parole possible after 25 years and a concurrent 21-year term.
- At sentencing, Arizona law (A.R.S. § 41-1604.09(I)) did not make juveniles who committed offenses after Jan 1, 1994, eligible for parole, so his sentence did not actually permit parole.
- Agboghidi pursued multiple post-conviction challenges (involuntary plea; ineffective assistance); prior appeals remanded and denied relief on the merits.
- After Miller v. Alabama, Agboghidi argued his mandatory life-without-parole exposure violated the Eighth Amendment; the superior court initially dismissed but later (on remand) granted relief and ordered resentencing.
- The Legislature enacted H.B. 2593 (A.R.S. § 13-716; amendments to § 41-1604.09), restoring parole eligibility for juvenile homicide offenders, including those sentenced earlier, making parole available after completion of the minimum term.
- The State petitioned review; the court held the superior court erred in ordering resentencing because the statutory changes provided the Miller remedy (meaningful parole opportunity) and resentencing was unnecessary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Miller requires resentencing for juveniles previously given life with parole-eligibility language but no actual parole regime | Agboghidi: Miller renders his sentence unconstitutional as applied; resentencing required | State: Legislature remedied Miller by restoring parole eligibility via H.B. 2593; resentencing unnecessary | Court: No resentencing required; statutory scheme affords meaningful parole opportunity and cures Miller violation |
| Whether H.B. 2593 is impermissibly retroactive or violates separation of powers | Agboghidi: H.B. 2593 cannot be applied retroactively; raises ex post facto and separation concerns | State: H.B. 2593 validly applies and remedies Miller without violating separation or ex post facto | Court: Rejected challenges; H.B. 2593 is not impermissibly retroactive and does not usurp judicial role |
| Whether A.R.S. § 13-716/A.R.S. § 41-1604.09 afford a meaningful opportunity for parole | Agboghidi: Statute still problematic (e.g., parole conditions, lifetime supervision) and may infringe vested rights | State: Statutory amendments create parole eligibility after minimum term, satisfying Miller | Court: Statutes grant parole eligibility after 25 years, providing the meaningful opportunity required by Miller |
| Whether superior court was bound by appellate precedent refusing resentencing | Agboghidi: Superior court nonetheless ordered resentencing | State: Superior court must follow appellate decisions (Vera/Randles) | Court: Superior court erred; bound by appellate decisions and must vacate resentencing order |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller is retroactive; states may remedy Miller by parole opportunity)
- State v. Vera, 235 Ariz. 571 (App. 2014) (Arizona appellate decision holding H.B. 2593 complies with Miller; resentencing not required)
- State v. Randles, 235 Ariz. 547 (App. 2014) (same holding as Vera regarding legislative remedy)
- State v. Valencia, 241 Ariz. 206 (2016) (recognizing Miller retroactivity in Arizona)
- State v. Patterson, 222 Ariz. 574 (App. 2009) (superior courts are bound by appellate decisions)