State v. Adams-Bey, 144 A.3d 1200

Background

In 1978 James Leslie Adams‑Bey, Jr. was convicted of first‑degree rape and related offenses; he received life plus ten years. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.
Decades later, after this Court’s decision in Unger v. State (2012) and then Waine (2015), Adams‑Bey moved to reopen his previously denied postconviction proceeding claiming the trial court gave advisory‑only jury instructions that violated due process.
The trial court denied the motion to reopen without a hearing after reviewing the trial transcript; the State argued the instructions were not advisory in the Unger/Waine sense.
The Court of Special Appeals granted leave, found the trial instructions were advisory only and structural error, reversed the denial, and remanded with instructions to reopen and grant a new trial.
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to resolve (1) whether the intermediate appellate court may order reopening under the UPPA and (2) whether Adams‑Bey’s jury instructions required relief.
The Court of Appeals affirmed: the Court of Special Appeals may review a circuit court’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion under Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 7‑109, and the trial’s advisory‑only instructions were structural error entitling Adams‑Bey to a new trial.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Adams‑Bey's Argument	Held
Whether § 7‑104 (may reopen if in "interests of justice") authorizes the Court of Special Appeals to order reopening	"Court" in § 7‑104 means only circuit court; intermediate court cannot itself determine interests of justice and order reopening	Court of Special Appeals may review denial and remand with instructions when circuit court abused discretion	§ 7‑104 applies to the circuit court only; but under § 7‑109 the Court of Special Appeals may review for abuse of discretion and reverse/remand with instructions
Whether the trial court’s jury instructions were "advisory only" and thus violated due process	Instructions here differed from Unger/Waine and did not expressly permit jurors to disregard binding constitutional protections; thus no Unger error	Jury was told they were judges of law and told to apply the law "as you find it to be" without being told that presumption of innocence and reasonable‑doubt standard were binding; that is advisory error	The instructions were advisory only and constituted structural error; reopening and a new trial are required
Standard of review on appeal from denial of motion to reopen	Court of Special Appeals improperly substituted its own interests‑of‑justice judgment (de novo)	Appellate review is for abuse of discretion; reversal permissible if circuit court failed to apply correct legal standard	Court of Special Appeals properly reviewed for abuse of discretion and found the circuit court abused it
Whether advisory‑only instruction error is subject to harmless‑error analysis	State argued factual/contextual analysis might avoid automatic reversal	Adams‑Bey relied on Sullivan and Waine: advisory‑only instructions that undermine reasonable‑doubt protection are structural	Such advisory‑only instructions that undermine bedrock protections are structural error and not subject to harmless‑error analysis; conviction must be vacated

Key Cases Cited

State v. Waine, 444 Md. 692 (2015) (advisory‑only instructions constitute structural error)
Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383 (2012) (pre‑Stevenson convictions may be challenged postconviction for advisory instructions)
Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167 (1980) (Article 23 requires advising jury they are judges of law; court limited that to law of the crime)
Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84 (1981) (presumption of innocence and reasonable‑doubt standard are not "law of the crime" and must be binding)
Gray v. State, 388 Md. 366 (2005) (motion to reopen under UPPA is within court’s discretion; appellate review is abuse‑of‑discretion)
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (defective reasonable‑doubt instruction is structural error)
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (structural errors deprive trial of fundamental fairness and cannot reliably determine guilt)