State v. Adams
2017 Ohio 7186
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Police were investigating a suspected heroin trafficking ring using GPS, wiretaps, and surveillance; they identified Manuel Montero and Anival Acosta as suspects and used an apartment near Easton as a suspected stash location.
- Detective Whitacre (undercover, plainclothes, unmarked car) observed Montero meet briefly in the Shades restaurant parking lot with Richard Adams (owner of Shades) and suspected a drug transaction after seeing them lean into a vehicle.
- Whitacre followed Adams; Adams attempted an illegal U-turn and pulled over; Officer Cibulskas (marked cruiser) stopped Adams based on radioed information and placed him in the cruiser after detecting a slight odor of marijuana.
- Officers asked for consent to search; Adams refused. Whitacre told Cibulskas he suspected narcotics in the vehicle and instructed them to wait for a K-9. A K-9 arrived, alerted, and officers found ~250 grams of heroin behind the front passenger seat.
- Adams moved to suppress the vehicle search evidence arguing (1) certain officers were incompetent to testify and (2) the stop was unreasonably prolonged under Rodriguez; the trial court denied suppression and Adams pleaded no contest.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Competency of undercover officer (Evid.R. 601(C)) to testify | Whitacre was a narcotics officer on surveillance, not on duty to enforce traffic laws, so he was competent to testify | Adams: Whitacre was in plain clothes and in an unmarked vehicle and thus incompetent to testify about the stop | Court: No abuse of discretion — Whitacre's main duty that day was narcotics surveillance, so Evid.R. 601(C) inapplicable |
| Competency of marked-unit officer (to testify about U-turn he didn’t see) | Cibulskas relied on Whitacre’s radioed observation; collective-knowledge doctrine imputes Whitacre’s facts to him | Adams: Cibulskas lacked personal knowledge because he did not observe the U‑turn | Court: Admitted testimony; under collective-knowledge doctrine it was competent and no plain error |
| Whether K-9 deployment and delay violated Rodriguez (unreasonable extension) | Police had reasonable suspicion developed during the stop (meet with known dealer, odor of marijuana, neighborhood commotion) to wait for K-9 | Adams: The dog sniff occurred after the purpose of the stop was complete; detention was unlawfully prolonged | Court: Denial of suppression affirmed — totality of circumstances gave reasonable suspicion to briefly extend the stop for K-9; dog alert provided probable cause for search |
| Whether evidence should be suppressed because of duration (26–27 minutes) | Even if the stop ran a bit long, the extension was justified by reasonable suspicion arising during the stop | Adams: Time exceeded reasonable duration under Rodriguez, so subsequent search invalid | Court: Extension was justified by reasonable suspicion; search lawful once dog alerted |
Key Cases Cited
- Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) (police may not prolong a traffic stop beyond its mission absent reasonable suspicion; whether a dog sniff adds time is the critical question)
- Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (a dog sniff during a lawful traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment if it does not prolong the stop)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes standards for investigative stops and reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (totality-of-the-circumstances test for reasonable suspicion)
- State v. Huth, 24 Ohio St.3d 114 (1986) (statutory/Rule interpretation: "on duty for the main purpose" refers to officer's overall duty, not limited to the moment of arrest)
- State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234 (1997) (Ohio precedent on scope of stops and officer authority)