State v. Adam M. Blackman
2017 Wisc. LEXIS 392
Wis.2017Background
- On June 22, 2013, Adam Blackman was involved in a collision that caused great bodily harm to a bicyclist; Deputy Abler requested a blood draw under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2. and read the statutorily required "Informing the Accused" form at the hospital; Blackman submitted and his BAC was .104.
- Abler testified he had no signs of intoxication and did not have probable cause to arrest for OWI; Blackman was not under arrest when taken to the hospital.
- The Informing the Accused form states refusal will result in revocation of operating privileges; § 343.305(3)(ar)2. itself states refusal may lead to arrest but does not directly provide for license revocation unless other statutory steps occur.
- The circuit court suppressed the blood-test evidence, finding Blackman’s consent coerced because the officer misrepresented the consequences of refusal; the court of appeals reversed.
- The Wisconsin Supreme Court granted review and reversed the court of appeals, affirmed suppression, and declined to apply the good-faith exception to admit the blood-test results.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Blackman) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Informing the Accused form misrepresented the consequences of refusing a § 343.305(3)(ar)2. test (license revocation) | The form falsely told Blackman that refusal would lead to license revocation when, under § 343.305(3)(ar)2., revocation is not automatically enforceable at a refusal hearing | The form reasonably conveyed the practical end result (revocation could follow via arrest/subsequent proceedings) and the officer properly read the statutorily required form | Court: The form, as applied to § 343.305(3)(ar)2. requests, misstated the law: revocation would not be enforceable at a refusal hearing absent proof of OWI probable cause |
| Whether the misstatement coerced Blackman’s consent (Fourth Amendment voluntariness) | The misrepresentation and the officer’s statements about department practice deprived Blackman of a free, unconstrained choice, so consent was involuntary | Consent was voluntary: Blackman was cooperative, not threatened, informed he could refuse, and mere reading of the form does not invalidate consent | Court: Under the totality of the circumstances and Schneckloth factors, the State failed to prove voluntary consent by clear and convincing evidence; consent was coerced |
| Whether to apply the good-faith exception to avoid exclusion of evidence | Suppression is required to deter systemic misinforming; good-faith exception should not apply where the misstatement is recurring and caused coercion | Officer acted in objective good faith following statute and department procedure; exclusion would not meaningfully deter future misconduct | Court: Good-faith exception does not apply; suppression warranted to deter recurring systemic error |
| Remedy and disposition | Suppress blood-test evidence and remand | Admit evidence (court of appeals result) | Court: Reverse court of appeals; reinstate suppression order and remand for further proceedings consistent with opinion |
Key Cases Cited
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (warrant generally required for blood draws; consent/warrant exceptions)
- Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (prosecution bears burden to prove consent was freely and voluntarily given)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (voluntariness of consent evaluated under totality of circumstances)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood tests are searches under the Fourth Amendment)
- Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (exclusionary rule’s deterrence focus; limits on suppression for negligent or isolated errors)
- Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (good-faith exception applies where officers reasonably rely on statute later found invalid)