410 P.3d 972
Mont.2018Background
- Police stopped Anna-Grace Jeffries after observing vehicle defects and discovered signs of intoxication; Intoxilyzer 8000 breath test recorded a .217 alcohol concentration.
- Jeffries was charged with aggravated DUI and related traffic offenses; she requested COBRA (internal Intoxilyzer) data for the 12 months before her test.
- The City/State produced calibration/testing records and BARF (printed Breath Analysis Report Form) records but did not have or produce COBRA data because it lacked the software/infrastructure to download it and the devices’ internal memory cards are routinely cleared.
- Jeffries moved to exclude the breath result (or dismiss) claiming spoliation and a due-process violation under Trombetta/Youngblood/Brady for failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence.
- Experts testified COBRA data can be useful for statistical/troubleshooting analysis but BARFs often contain the key diagnostic information; comparable analysis could be done by manually reviewing printed BARFs.
- Municipal Court denied exclusion; District Court affirmed. Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding no due-process violation absent bad faith and that COBRA data was not shown to be apparently exculpatory or indispensable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jeffries) | Defendant's Argument (State/City) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether failure to produce COBRA data violated due process and required exclusion of breath evidence | COBRA data was potentially exculpatory and the State acted in bad faith by not acquiring software and by routinely deleting internal data; exclusion warranted under Trombetta/Youngblood | COBRA data was at best potentially useful, not apparently exculpatory; BARFs and printed records suffice for comparable analysis; no bad faith in routine deletion or lack of software | Denied — no due-process violation: COBRA data not shown to be apparently exculpatory, comparable evidence available, and no bad faith |
| Whether civil spoliation doctrine applies to criminal proceedings | Spoliation remedy should apply because evidence was destroyed | Spoliation (civil tort/remedy) is not the proper procedure in criminal cases governed by Title 46 and criminal discovery precedents | Denied — civil spoliation doctrine not applicable in criminal proceeding |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose materially favorable evidence)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (Brady materiality standard: reasonable probability that disclosure would change outcome)
- California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) (lost evidence must be apparently exculpatory and irreplaceable to violate due process)
- Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (failure to preserve potentially useful evidence is not a due-process violation absent bad faith)
- State v. Weisbarth, 384 Mont. 424 (Mont. 2016) (elements for asserting Brady violation under Montana law)
- U.S. v. Toro-Barboza, 673 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (routine destruction of evidence with no knowledge it is likely exculpatory does not offend due process)