826 S.E.2d 346
W. Va.2019Background
- Petitioner James W. Young Jr. was arrested after a single-vehicle accident and charged with second-offense DUI; he had a prior DUI conviction.
- In magistrate court Young moved for and received deferred adjudication under W. Va. Code § 61-11-22a; the State opposed on statutory grounds.
- The magistrate accepted a deferred-adjudication agreement: two years unsupervised probation, license forfeiture, and conditional disposition converting to first- or second-offense conviction depending on compliance.
- The State petitioned the Circuit Court of Morgan County for a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the magistrate’s deferred-adjudication order.
- The circuit court granted the writ, concluding Chapter 17C (W. Va. Code § 17C-5-2b) controls DUI deferrals and bars deferral for second/subsequent DUI. Young appealed.
- The Supreme Court of Appeals reviewed statutory construction de novo and affirmed the circuit court: § 17C-5-2b (specific DUI deferral scheme) precludes using the general deferral statute § 61-11-22a for second-offense DUI.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 61-11-22a (general deferred adjudication) is available for a DUI charge | Young: § 61-11-22a applies generally to misdemeanors and therefore can be used for DUI deferral | State: Chapter 17C § 17C-5-2b is the specific statute governing DUI deferral and bars second/subsequent DUI deferrals | Held: § 17C-5-2b is the specific statute and controls; § 61-11-22a is not available for DUI deferral in second-offense cases |
| Whether § 61-11-22a conflicts with § 17C-5-2b and renders § 17C-5-2b redundant | Young: statutes can be harmonized; §17C-5-2b’s exclusion applies only within that section | State: applying § 61-11-22a to DUI would nullify the specific prohibitions in § 17C-5-2b(g) | Held: statutes conflict; specific DUI statute prevails and prevents redundancy |
| Whether the circuit court erred in relying on alternative statutory provisions or sequencing of enactments | Young: legislative history/sequence undermines the circuit court’s alternative rationale | State: specific DUI statute governs regardless of sequencing | Held: Court resolves case on specific-versus-general rule; affirmance does not rely on alternative provision |
| Whether prohibition was improper because the State had other remedies (e.g., Rule 35 or magistrate correction) | Young: State could have used post-sentencing correction remedies instead of prohibition | State: remedies cited were inapplicable or not raised below | Held: Court declines to consider unraised remedy issues on appeal; prohibition was proper here |
Key Cases Cited
- Vest v. Cobb, 138 W. Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1953) (primary rule of statutory construction: give effect to legislative intent)
- Tug Valley Recovery Ctr., Inc. v. Mingo Cty. Comm’n, 164 W. Va. 94, 261 S.E.2d 165 (W. Va. 1979) (statutes on same subject are read in pari materia)
- UMWA by Trumka v. Kingdon, 174 W. Va. 330, 325 S.E.2d 120 (W. Va. 1984) (specific statute takes precedence over general when irreconcilable)
- State ex rel. Graney v. Sims, 144 W. Va. 72, 105 S.E.2d 886 (W. Va. 1958) (statutes in pari materia must be construed together)
- Martin v. W. Va. Div. of Labor Contractor Licensing Bd., 199 W. Va. 613, 486 S.E.2d 782 (W. Va. 1997) (standard of appellate review for writ of prohibition is de novo)