836 S.E.2d 472
W. Va.2019Background
- DHHR filed an abuse-and-neglect petition (Jan 2018) concerning six children (five adopted to respondents R.B. and T.B.; one foster child) after in‑camera disclosures of sustained physical and emotional abuse and coercion by respondents.
- The circuit court adjudicated respondents abusive based on credible, corroborated child testimony and evidence of domestic violence and parental alcohol abuse.
- Respondents largely denied the allegations, minimized their conduct, and blamed a former foster child; court‑ordered psychological evaluations found poor prognosis and lack of insight/denial, cautioning against reunification.
- Guardian ad litem and DHHR recommended termination; children (particularly the older ones) expressed unwillingness to return or have visitation.
- At disposition the circuit court granted a six‑month improvement period, but its order did not discuss the psychological evaluations or analyze the children’s best interests.
- The Supreme Court of Appeals granted a writ of prohibition, holding the improvement period was clearly erroneous as a matter of law and remanding with instructions to terminate respondents’ parental and custodial rights.
Issues
| Issue | Petitioners' Argument | Respondents' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the circuit court erred in granting a post‑adjudicatory/dispositional improvement period | The court failed to consider probative evidence (psych evaluations, GAL report), mischaracterized respondents’ "acknowledgement," and ignored the children’s best interests; an improvement period would jeopardize permanency. | Respondents argued they acknowledged some wrongdoing, would fully participate in services, and an improvement period was warranted despite DHHR timing/visitation disputes. | Court held the grant was clearly erroneous; improvement periods require analysis showing they do not jeopardize the child’s best interests, and that showing was absent. |
| Whether mere compliance with § 49‑4‑610 statutory thresholds entitles a parent to an improvement period | Petitioners: statutory compliance alone is insufficient when award would jeopardize best interests; court must make findings demonstrating lack of prejudice to the child. | Respondents: satisfied statutory criteria and willing to participate, therefore entitled to an improvement period. | Held: Compliance with § 49‑4‑610 does not unconditionally entitle a parent to an improvement period; circuit courts must analyze and find that the improvement period will not harm the child. |
| Whether respondents adequately acknowledged the abuse such that an improvement period would be effective | Petitioners: psychological evaluations and service provider testimony show denial/minimization; lack of true acknowledgment makes treatment futile and improvement period inappropriate. | Respondents: claimed some admissions ("overly harsh," arguing caused harm) and cooperation with services justified an improvement period. | Held: Respondents’ statements were insufficient; they continued to deny/minimize and blame others, supporting conclusion that an improvement period would be futile. |
| Proper remedy where improvement period improperly granted | Petitioners: extraordinary writ of prohibition is appropriate to prevent irremediable prejudice and to secure permanency for children—termination warranted. | Respondents: (implicitly) disagreed with termination; sought to proceed under improvement period. | Held: Writ granted; remanded with instruction to terminate parental and custodial rights and to provide for children’s needed services and permanency review. |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996) (factors for issuance of writ of prohibition where lower court exceeds legitimate powers)
- In re R. J. M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980) (least restrictive alternative and when termination may be proper, particularly for very young children)
- In re Jeffrey R.L., 190 W. Va. 24, 435 S.E.2d 162 (1993) (termination may be employed without intervening less‑restrictive alternatives where conditions cannot be corrected)
- In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 540 S.E.2d 542 (2000) (parent is not unconditionally entitled to an improvement period when it would jeopardize the child’s best interests)
- State ex rel. Amy M. v. Kaufman, 196 W. Va. 251, 470 S.E.2d 205 (1996) (use of prohibition in child abuse and neglect proceedings where appeal is inadequate)
- In re Kaitlyn P., 225 W. Va. 123, 690 S.E.2d 131 (2010) (a parent must acknowledge the abuse/neglect problem to make it treatable)
- In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004) (statutory and case law emphasize no unconditional entitlement to improvement periods)
- In re M. M., 236 W. Va. 108, 778 S.E.2d 338 (2015) (upholding denial of improvement period where psychological evaluations and child testimony showed guarded prognosis and continued risk)
- In re J. G., 240 W. Va. 194, 809 S.E.2d 453 (2018) (discretion in abuse and neglect cases does not immunize circuit court from review; permanency and best interests paramount)
- In re Christina L., 194 W. Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995) (when parental rights terminated, court may still consider post‑termination visitation if in child’s best interests)