State of West Virginia v. Jeffrey Lynn Hovatter, 16-1110

Defendant Jeffrey Lynn Hovatter was indicted for first-degree murder after the victim (his ex-wife) was found shot in her Fairmont home on July 30, 2015; Hovatter had a nonfatal gunshot wound to his face and was conscious when found.
A competency/forensic evaluation showed major depressive disorder and earlier delusions/hallucinations in jail but concluded Hovatter was competent to stand trial and criminally responsible at the time of the offense.
Hovatter did not move pretrial to bifurcate the guilt and mercy phases; defense counsel and defendant discussed the option but made no motion.
At trial a jury convicted Hovatter of first-degree murder and declined to recommend mercy; the circuit court later sentenced him to life without parole.
On appeal Hovatter argued (1) the court should have sua sponte held a hearing to ensure his decision to forgo bifurcation was knowing and voluntary given his psychiatric history, and (2) the court erred by admitting certain lay-opinion testimony from Detective Eric Hudson.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court had a duty to hold a pretrial hearing sua sponte to ensure defendant’s decision to waive bifurcation was knowing	State: No sua sponte duty; waiver/bifurcation is matter for defense strategy	Hovatter: Given head injury and jail delusions, court should have ensured waiver was knowing and voluntary	Court: No duty to sua sponte order/hear bifurcation; defendant failed to move and was competent, so no error
Admissibility of detective’s lay-opinion testimony about wound, cartridge, and powder stippling	State: Testimony was lay opinion based on personal observations and experience, permissible under Rule 701	Hovatter: Statements were prejudicial, improper opinion testimony beyond lay witness scope	Court: Statements about wound and cartridge admissible as lay opinion; trial court sustained objection and curtailed the gunpowder remark, so no reversible error

Contee v. United States, 410 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (unitary trial involving insanity defenses may be prejudicial; courts should be alert to need for bifurcation)
Holmes v. United States, 363 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (discussing prejudice from unitary trials with insanity defenses)
State v. LaRock, 196 W. Va. 294, 470 S.E.2d 613 (1996) (trial court has discretionary authority to bifurcate guilt and mercy phases)
State v. Heater, 237 W. Va. 638, 790 S.E.2d 49 (2016) (decision to seek bifurcation is tactical; court not required to order bifurcation sua sponte)
State v. Rodoussakis, 204 W. Va. 58, 511 S.E.2d 469 (1998) (evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion)
State v. McKinley, 234 W. Va. 143, 764 S.E.2d 303 (2014) (lay-opinion admissibility standards under Rule 701)
Cox v. Galigher Motor Sales Co., 158 W. Va. 685, 213 S.E.2d 475 (1975) (trial court discretion to qualify witness for opinion testimony)
Schofield v. W. Va. Dep’t of Corr., 185 W. Va. 199, 406 S.E.2d 425 (1991) (dissenting opinion cited regarding importance of mercy phase presentation)