State of West Virginia v. Norma G., 15-0713

Background

Norma G. was indicted for felony extortion after she told law enforcement that her husband, J.G., had shown pornographic material to their eight‑year‑old daughter and that she had told J.G. to deed his farm to her or she would report him. The deed was executed August 23, 2011; the report to police was months later when J.G. refused to leave the property.
At trial the State presented testimony from J.G. (who said he signed the deed to avoid prosecution) and Corporal Baker (who said Norma repeatedly threatened to report J.G. unless he conveyed the farm). Norma testified in her defense; the jury convicted her of extortion.
During trial the prosecutor apologized after defense counsel alleged improper communications with counsel for a potential defense witness (Kevin M.); the court found no prosecutorial misconduct or prejudice, and Kevin M. did not testify.
Post‑trial it was discovered that a juror on the venire (Juror O) was ineligible to serve in Greenbrier County. The State had used a peremptory strike to remove that juror before empanelling the jury; the court denied a new trial for lack of prejudice.
The trial court excluded testimony from a clergyman invoked for J.G. on priest‑penitent privilege grounds. The court also addressed but rejected challenges based on statutory overbreadth, jury instructions on intent, sufficiency of the evidence, speedy‑trial rules, and cumulative error.
Sentence: one to five years (suspended with home confinement). The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Norma G.)	Held
Constitutionality/overbreadth of extortion statute (W.Va. Code §61‑2‑13)	Statute requires purpose to obtain pecuniary benefit; not overbroad.	Statute lacks an express intent element and criminalizes protected speech; thus overbroad under First Amendment and state constitution.	Statute upheld; plain language requires threats made to extort pecuniary benefit; not overbroad.
Jury instruction re: criminal intent	Existing instructions adequately required proof defendant accused J.G. to obtain property.	Trial court erred by refusing defense instruction defining "criminal intent to commit extortion."	No reversible error; jury charge as given sufficiently instructed on purpose/intent element.
Prosecutorial misconduct (improper communication with witness's counsel)	Prosecutor acted to protect witness's interests; apologized; no record that witness was influenced; no prejudice shown; witness could have been subpoenaed.	Prosecutor intimidated/warned the witness and thus prevented testimony; mistrial required.	No mistrial; court found no misconduct amounting to reversible error and no demonstrated prejudice.
Sufficiency of the evidence	Evidence (deed, victim's testimony, officer testimony) supports conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.	Defendant received property voluntarily in exchange for silence; not extortion.	Evidence sufficient when viewed in light most favorable to prosecution; conviction affirmed.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657 (1995) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence in criminal cases)
State v. Foster, 221 W. Va. 629 (2007) (standard for reviewing jury instructions)
Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar v. Printz, 187 W. Va. 182 (1992) (extortion is malum in se; discussion of lawyer communications)
State v. Potter, 197 W. Va. 734 (1996) (tests for clergy‑penitent privilege under W. Va. Code §57‑3‑9)
State v. Miller, 197 W. Va. 588 (1996) (standards for reviewing juror qualification challenges)