State of West Virginia v. Tulsa Johnson, 238 W. Va. 580

On Sept. 14, 2014 Michael Garcia was shot to death after meeting with Tulsa Johnson, Vincent Smith, and others; Johnson and Smith were later tried together.
A grand jury indicted Johnson for first-degree murder, felony murder, first-degree robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery; a jury convicted Johnson of felony murder and conspiracy to commit robbery.
At trial an investigating deputy (Deputy Christian) interpreted historical cell‑site (tower) records and mapped phone activity to towers; he testified as a lay witness without having been qualified as an expert.
The prosecutor made closing-argument remarks about DNA evidence that implicated co-defendant Smith; Johnson’s counsel did not object at trial.
On appeal Johnson argued (1) the deputy should have been qualified and admitted as an expert under Rule 702 to present historical cell‑site analysis, and (2) the prosecutor’s DNA comments were improper.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed: it held expert qualification was required for historical cell‑site analysis (admission of the deputy’s lay testimony was error), but the error was harmless; Johnson waived the DNA‑argument challenge by failing to object at trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an investigating officer may give lay opinion locating phones using historical cell‑site data	Johnson: historical cell‑site interpretation is technical/specialized and required expert qualification under Rule 702; lay testimony violated amended Rule 701(c)	State: the officer’s testimony merely reported facts from stipulated carrier records and was admissible lay testimony	Court: Historical cell‑site analysis is technical; witnesses must be qualified as experts under Rule 702. Admission of the deputy’s lay opinion was error but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Whether prosecutor’s closing remarks about DNA improperly prejudiced Johnson	Johnson: prosecutor’s comment implied a definitive identification of Smith and was prejudicial	State: comments were proper; plus Johnson lacks standing and failed to object	Court: Johnson waived the issue by failing to object at trial (and even if preserved, the court would reject it on the merits in related co‑defendant appeal).

State v. Nichols, 208 W. Va. 432, 541 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1999) (standard for admitting lay opinion testimony under Rule 701)
State v. Huffman, 141 W. Va. 55, 87 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1955) (trial court evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion)
Torrence v. Kusminsky, 185 W. Va. 734, 408 S.E.2d 684 (W. Va. 1991) (harmless‑error principle when improper evidence is admitted)
State v. Atkins, 163 W. Va. 502, 261 S.E.2d 55 (W. Va. 1979) (test for harmlessness of nonconstitutional improper evidence)
United States v. Hill, 818 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2016) (historical cell‑site analysis treated as expert testimony)
State v. Patton, 419 S.W.3d 125 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (rejecting lay testimony for cell‑site location; expert required)
Payne v. State, 440 Md. 680, 104 A.3d 142 (Md. 2014) (cell‑site records and call‑detail interpretation require expert testimony)