State of West Virginia v. William T. Redman III, 15-1039

Background

In 2005 petitioner William T. Redman III lived with the child’s family; the child later (2005 interview) accused him of offering money to watch him masturbate and of repeated touching of her genital area under clothing while living previously in Wetzel County.
In 2011 the child (then ~16) told her guardian ad litem more extensive allegations that abuse began when she was about four and continued, including hiding in her closet, smelling underwear, kissing/neck rubbing, forced touching, masturbation in front of her, and touching her genitalia with his hand/fingers; she denied intercourse and initially denied penetration in earlier interviews.
A 2013 Ohio County grand jury returned a six-count indictment charging multiple counts of first‑degree sexual assault, sexual abuse by a custodian, and first‑degree sexual abuse; four counts alleged penetration (digital penetration) based on Sgt. Adams’s testimony before the grand jury.
Pretrial motions to dismiss/quash the penetration-related counts alleged grand‑jury misconduct because the child had earlier denied penetration; the trial court found no willful, intentional fraud and denied relief.
At trial the child testified with more detailed description that petitioner used his hand/fingers to touch/rub her external genitalia "in and out of the lips," explained earlier inconsistent uses of the word "penetration," and placed the act in late 2005; the jury convicted Redman on four counts and he was sentenced to 36–80 years.
On appeal Redman argued (1) grand‑jury error re: penetration testimony, (2) trial court erred refusing to strike a prospective juror for cause, (3) errors denying judgment of acquittal (penetration, age, timeframe), and (4) overall insufficiency of evidence. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Redman)	Held
Whether indictment counts alleging penetration should be dismissed for misleading grand‑jury testimony	Grand‑jury testimony by Sgt. Adams reflected his investigatory determination of penetration and was proper	Grand jury was misled because the child earlier denied penetration; prosecutor’s leading questions and Sgt. Adams’ answers lacked factual basis	Denied: no allegation/proof of willful, intentional fraud; court will not probe grand‑jury evidence absent such fraud
Whether the court erred by refusing to strike a prospective juror (child sexual‑abuse victim) for cause	Juror stated she could be impartial and believed in presumption of innocence; State relied on peremptory removal	Juror’s prior abuse and equivocal answers showed bias and required removal for cause	Denied: juror’s answers did not show bias; juror was removed by defendant’s peremptory strike, no demonstrable prejudice shown
Whether judgment of acquittal should have been granted for lack of proof of penetration and defendant’s age	Evidence (trial testimony) described hand/finger contact "into" external genital area; jury could infer age >14 from circumstances	Child’s inconsistent statements and prior denials meant no proof of penetration; age not proved	Denied: child’s trial testimony (describing insertion/"into") sufficient for jury to find penetration; statutes permit inference of defendant’s age from circumstances
Whether the evidence overall was insufficient to support convictions	Evidence viewed in light most favorable to State, including victim testimony and corroborating investigation, was sufficient	Inconsistent statements across 2005, 2011, and trial undercut credibility and reasonable doubt exists	Denied: credibility/resolution of inconsistencies are jury province; a rational jury could find guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Key Cases Cited

Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (grand‑jury dismissal appropriate only where violation substantially influenced indictment or grave doubt exists)
Barker v. Fox, 160 W.Va. 749, 238 S.E.2d 235 (court may not probe grand‑jury evidence except for willful, intentional fraud)
State v. Sutherland, 231 W.Va. 410, 745 S.E.2d 448 (use of peremptory to remove biased juror precludes reversal absent a showing of prejudice)
State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence; view evidence in light most favorable to prosecution)
State v. LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294, 470 S.E.2d 613 (de novo review of judgment of acquittal; scrutinize evidence favoring verdict)