State of West Virginia v. Karl Halstead, 16-0125

Karl Halstead and his son Kevin asked three boys, including nine-year-old B.C., to do yard work; Kevin forcibly sodomized B.C. while Karl held the child and touched his buttocks; both threatened the victim to keep silent.
Karl was indicted in Sept. 2014, fled the jurisdiction, was arrested in Indiana, refused extradition, and was returned; he waived trial during the then-current term after consulting counsel.
Trial was scheduled, briefly continued to allow the State to obtain medical records and prepare expert witnesses; petitioner later requested a longer continuance for defense preparation.
Jury convicted Karl of three counts of aiding and abetting first-degree sexual assault (principal in second degree); he received three consecutive statutory maximum sentences of 25–100 years (total 75–300 years), lifetime sex-offender registration, and fifty years supervised release upon any release.
Karl appealed asserting (1) improper continuance beyond the term of court without good cause (WV Code § 62-3-1) and (2) improper sentencing factors / disproportionate sentence compared to his son.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Halstead)	Held
Whether the circuit court abused discretion in granting continuance beyond the term of indictment	Continued short-term continuance was supported by need to obtain minor-victim medical records, identify experts, and pending motions; good cause existed	Continuance lacked good cause, State was not diligent, petitioner’s prior flight did not justify delay, and waiver of trial term did not waive speedy-trial rights	The court found good cause for the short continuance; no abuse of discretion and WV Code § 62-3-21 governs speedy-trial remedy rather than § 62-3-1
Whether sentencing used improper factors or was disproportionate relative to co-defendant	Sentences were within statutory limits for first-degree sexual assault and as an aider/abettor punishable as principal; disparate sentences among codefendants are not per se unconstitutional	Judge injected personal views; sentence disproportionate compared to son who received an effective shorter term	Sentence was statutory and permissible; no reversible error absent impermissible factor and record insufficient to show defendants similarly situated

State v. Lacy, 232 S.E.2d 519 (W. Va. 1977) (distinguishing term-of-indictment rule from statutory speedy-trial protection)
State ex rel. Shorter v. Hey, 294 S.E.2d 51 (W. Va. 1981) (trial court discretion to grant continuance for good cause under § 62-3-1)
State v. Bush, 255 S.E.2d 539 (W. Va. 1979) (continuance rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion)
State v. Goodnight, 287 S.E.2d 504 (W. Va. 1982) (sentences within statutory limits and not based on impermissible factor not subject to appellate reversal)
State v. Hays, 408 S.E.2d 614 (W. Va. 1991) (same principle regarding appellate review of sentencing)
State v. Fortner, 397 S.E.2d 812 (W. Va. 1990) (principals in first and second degree defined for accomplices)
State v. Buck, 314 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 1984) (disparate sentences for codefendants are not per se unconstitutional; courts consider relative culpability and other factors)