State of West Virginia v. Wesley Owen Payne, 15-0582

Background

In May 2013 Wesley Payne shot and killed Donnie Baker; Payne was indicted for first-degree murder and abduction; abduction later dismissed and jury convicted him of second-degree murder.
Payne claimed he acted in self-defense after the intoxicated victim fired a 9mm rifle at him; he testified he fired one shotgun shot while retreating and that the shotgun belonged to the victim.
The sole eyewitness to the shooting, Lisa Hughes, initially told police Payne opened fire from outside, but at trial gave a conflicting account claiming Payne fired a single "lucky" self-defense shot; the jury found Hughes’s trial testimony not credible.
Additional evidence: multiple firearms were fired during the incident, no shotgun shells were found in the victim’s residence, broken glass and other forensics suggested shots after the victim was already bleeding, and a witness (Prichard) testified Payne hid guns, changed clothes, and acted nervously after the shooting.
Payne moved for judgment of acquittal (styled as motion to strike verdict) and for a new trial alleging insufficient evidence (no malice), prosecutorial misconduct/speculation, improper use of Hughes’s prior statement, juror prejudice from gallery comments, and facial vagueness of the second-degree murder statute; the trial court denied relief and resentenced Payne to 30 years.
The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, finding sufficient evidence of malice and that the jury reasonably rejected Payne’s self-defense claim, and rejecting all claims of trial error and constitutional vagueness.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence / judgment of acquittal	State: evidence (forensics, witness Prichard, inconsistent accounts) supports second-degree murder and malice	Payne: acted in self-defense; prosecution failed to prove malice or elements beyond reasonable doubt	Affirmed: viewing evidence favorably to State, a rational jury could find malice and reject self-defense credibility
Motion for new trial — prosecutorial remarks	State: comments were reasonable inferences from evidence	Payne: prosecutor misstated evidence, speculated, prejudiced jury	Denied: remarks were based on evidence and permissible inferences
Use of Hughes’s prior statement	State: used to impeach Hughes under Rule 607, not admitted substantively	Payne: trial court barred statement but prosecutor nonetheless introduced it improperly	Denied: court allowed impeachment by prior inconsistent recorded statement; statement not admitted as substantive evidence
Juror misconduct (gallery comments)	State: no evidence jurors heard or were influenced by comments	Payne: relatives’ derogatory comments contaminated jury	Denied: no clear & convincing evidence of juror misconduct or prejudice
Facial vagueness of WV Code § 61-2-1 (second-degree murder)	Payne: statute fails to define prohibited conduct and is unconstitutionally vague	State: statute plainly proscribes murder not meeting first-degree definitions	Denied: statute gives fair notice; second-degree defined by exclusion from first-degree categories

Key Cases Cited

State v. Vance, 207 W.Va. 640, 535 S.E.2d 484 (2000) (standard of review for circuit court rulings)
State v. Blevins, 231 W.Va. 135, 744 S.E.2d 245 (2013) (appellate review principles)
State v. Juntilla, 227 W.Va. 492, 711 S.E.2d 562 (2011) (de novo review for denial of judgment of acquittal)
State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995) (sufficiency-of-evidence standard in criminal cases)
Lister v. Ballard, 237 W.Va. 34, 784 S.E.2d 733 (2016) (deference to trier of fact on witness credibility)
State v. Messer, 223 W.Va. 197, 672 S.E.2d 333 (2008) (prosecutor may argue reasonable inferences from the evidence)
State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700, 478 S.E.2d 550 (1996) (prior inconsistent statements used for impeachment only)
State v. Sutphin, 195 W.Va. 551, 466 S.E.2d 402 (1995) (burden to prove juror misconduct and prejudice)
State v. Galford, 87 W.Va. 358, 105 S.E. 237 (1920) (malice is essential element of second-degree murder)