State of West Virginia v. Adam Barnhart, 16-0032

Adam Barnhart pleaded guilty to second-degree murder (from a dismissed first-degree indictment) and two counts of wanton endangerment with a firearm pursuant to a plea agreement.
The agreed sentence was definite terms: 40 years for second-degree murder and two consecutive 5-year terms for wanton endangerment, for an aggregate of 50 years.
The plea agreement included an express waiver by Barnhart of any parole eligibility for those sentences; the circuit court found the waiver knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and accepted the pleas.
Barnhart filed a Rule 35(a) motion arguing the sentence was illegal because the parties and the court lacked authority to impose a plea that waived statutorily mandated parole eligibility (citing WV Code § 62-12-13(b)(1)(A)).
The circuit court denied relief, finding parole eligibility is a statutory right that may be waived if the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; Barnhart appealed.
The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the waiver was valid and did not make the sentence illegal; it distinguished Bates and applied waiver and plea-vacatur principles.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a plea agreement provision waiving parole eligibility renders the sentence illegal	Barnhart: waiver was void because parties/court lacked authority to accept an agreement eliminating statutorily mandated parole eligibility	State/Circuit: parole eligibility is a statutory right but can be waived if done knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily; the court properly accepted the waiver	The court held the parole-waiver was a valid, knowing waiver and did not make the sentence illegal; denial of Rule 35 motion affirmed
Whether Bates controls to prohibit parole-waivers	Barnhart: relies on Bates to argue waiver of parole eligibility is impermissible	State: Bates concerns jury instruction in capital sentencing and is distinguishable; it does not bar waivers here	Court rejected Bates as controlling and found it distinguishable
Remedy when a plea term is legally impossible to enforce	Barnhart: sought excision of the parole-waiver provision (not vacatur of entire plea)	State/Court: if a plea is impossible to fulfill, the remedy is vacatur of the plea, not selective excision	Court noted established rule: legally impossible plea requires vacatur, but found waiver valid so no vacatur required
Standard of review for Rule 35 challenge	Barnhart: challenged legality of sentence	State: applied standard from Marcum/Head	Court applied abuse of discretion for Rule 35, de novo for legal questions and affirmed circuit court

State v. Head, 198 W.Va. 298, 480 S.E.2d 507 (W.Va. 1996) (standards of review for Rule 35 motions)
State ex rel. Gessler v. Mazzone, 212 W.Va. 368, 572 S.E.2d 891 (W.Va. 2002) (if a plea agreement is legally impossible to fulfill, the proper remedy is vacatur and return to pre-plea positions)
Call v. McKenzie, 159 W.Va. 191, 220 S.E.2d 665 (W.Va. 1975) (criminal defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive constitutional rights when shown on the record)
Asbury v. Mohn, 162 W.Va. 662, 256 S.E.2d 547 (W.Va. 1979) (statutory and constitutional rights, e.g., right to appeal, may be waived)
Bates v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 768 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2014) (addressed parole-ineligibility jury instruction in capital sentencing; court here found it distinguishable)