State of West Virginia v. Taylor R. Wasson, Jr.
236 W. Va. 238
| W. Va. | 2015Background
- Taylor R. Wasson pled guilty to burglary for theft from Samuel and Betty Boynton; other counts were dismissed by plea agreement. He received 1–15 years and a restitution hearing was held.
- The Boyntons filed an insurance claim with State Farm for stolen items; State Farm adjusted for depreciation and paid the Boyntons $5,478.93 under their policy (after deductible and policy limits).
- At sentencing the circuit court ordered Wasson to pay $5,739.80 to the Boyntons (unrecovered loss) and $5,478.93 to State Farm (the amount State Farm paid to the Boyntons).
- Wasson appealed only the award to State Farm, arguing insurers are not "victims" under W. Va. Code § 61-11A-4(a) unless the defendant intended to obtain benefits from the insurer (relying on Lucas and McGill).
- The circuit court awarded restitution to State Farm under W. Va. Code § 61-11A-4(e), which permits restitution to a person who has compensated the victim to the extent of compensation paid; the court treated "person" to include corporations per W. Va. Code § 2-2-10(i).
- The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, holding § 61-11A-4(e) authorizes restitution to an insurer to the extent it compensated the victim for losses attributable to the defendant.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an insurer may receive restitution when it compensated the victim | State/Respondent: Circuit court may order restitution to any person who compensated the victim under § 61-11A-4(e) | Wasson: Insurer is not a "direct victim" under § 61-11A-4(a); restitution to insurers is improper absent defendant obtaining benefits from insurer | Court: § 61-11A-4(e) plainly permits restitution to a person (including corporations/insurers) who compensated the victim to the extent of compensation paid; affirmed |
| Proper scope of "person" for § 61-11A-4(e) | State: "Person" includes corporations per W. Va. Code § 2-2-10(i) | Wasson: "Person" should be read narrowly; awarding insurers is unfair and duplicates subrogation remedies | Court: Statutory text and construction rule support treating corporations/insurers as "person"; allowing restitution to insurers serves victims and rehabilitation/punishment goals |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Lucas, 201 W.Va. 271, 496 S.E.2d 221 (W. Va. 1997) (restitution normally ordered for victims; insurer can be a direct victim when defendant intended to collect insurance proceeds)
- Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (W. Va. 1995) (de novo review for statutory interpretation)
- State v. McGill, 230 W.Va. 85, 736 S.E.2d 85 (W. Va. 2012) (restitution statutes compensate direct victims, not society or governmental agencies)
- Fox v. State, 176 W.Va. 677, 347 S.E.2d 197 (W. Va. 1986) (restitution aids offender rehabilitation and emphasizes offender responsibility)
- People v. Birkett, 980 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1999) (policy: offender should not receive windfall when victim is insured; restitution should require offender to pay full cost of crime)