858 S.E.2d 936
W. Va.2021Background
- In 2011 Phalen committed a sexual-offense; in 2012 he pled guilty and received 1–5 years incarceration plus a mandated term of extended supervised release under § 62-12-26.
- He completed the prison term in 2013, began supervised release, violated its conditions, and in 2017 the circuit court revoked release and ordered a 10-year determinate term for the revocation.
- After serving one-fourth of the 10-year term, the Parole Board granted parole and Phalen was released on June 29, 2020.
- In late 2020 DOCR adopted internal policies (Policy Directive 151.06) asserting inmates incarcerated for violating supervised release are ineligible for parole and for day-for-day good time; DOCR then issued an arrest warrant and reincarcerated Phalen.
- While Phalen’s habeas petition was pending this Court, the Legislature enacted S.B. 713 (effective April 30, 2021), amending the good-time statute to exclude inmates committed under § 62-12-26 from receiving commutation (with a narrow credit carve-out for releases calculated before Oct. 21, 2020).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether post-revocation incarceration under § 62-12-26 is a "sentence" permitting parole eligibility under § 62-12-13(b)(1)(A) | Phalen: § 62-12-13 applies to “any inmate” who has served one-fourth of a definite term; no exclusion for § 62-12-26 revocations | Roberts/DOCR: Post-revocation incarceration is a "sanction," not a new "sentence" (relying on Hargus), so parole/good-time statutes don’t apply | Court: Hargus does not categorize post-revocation confinement as anything other than a sentence; § 62-12-13(b)(1)(A) applies and Phalen was eligible and properly paroled on June 29, 2020; the warrant was issued in error |
| Whether S.B. 713 may be applied to deny good-time to inmates whose underlying offenses predate the statute (ex post facto claim) | Phalen: Retroactive denial of good-time for crimes committed before the statute’s effective date violates ex post facto protections | Roberts: S.B. 713 excludes § 62-12-26 commitments from good time; statute governs and shortens commutation for such inmates | Court: Applying S.B. 713 to offenses committed before April 30, 2021 would increase punishment and violate ex post facto; § 15A-4-17 (as amended) cannot be applied to those whose underlying crimes predate the statute |
| Validity/enforceability of DOCR policy directives excluding parole/good-time for § 62-12-26 inmates | Phalen: DOCR policy misreads law and cannot override statutes or controlling precedent | Roberts: Policies reflect DOCR’s interpretation and enforcement position | Court: DOCR’s policy rests on a flawed reading of Hargus and is unenforceable to deny parole or good-time rights under the statutes |
| Appropriate habeas remedy | Phalen: Writ to reinstate parole and recalc good-time under law in effect at time of offense | Roberts: Opposes reinstatement given DOCR stance and S.B. 713 | Court: Writ granted—Phalen must be reinstated to parole and good-time must be calculated under the statute in effect when his underlying offense occurred |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hargus, 232 W. Va. 736, 753 S.E.2d 895 (W. Va. 2013) (post-revocation incarceration is part of the original sentencing scheme; revocation proceedings are continuation of original prosecution)
- Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 164 W. Va. 292, 262 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1980) (newer good-time statute cannot be applied retroactively if it disadvantages inmates; ex post facto protection requires using old good-time rules for pre-enactment offenses)
- Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (U.S. 2000) (post-revocation penalties are attributed to the original conviction and revocation need not be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (U.S. 1981) (ex post facto test: a retrospective law that disadvantages the offender is prohibited)
- Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (U.S. 1997) (application of ex post facto principles to sentencing/credits)
- State v. James, 227 W. Va. 407, 710 S.E.2d 98 (W. Va. 2011) (upholding aspects of § 62-12-26; supervised-release scheme is part of the sentencing framework)