State of West Virginia ex rel. Morgantown Oper. Co. LLC v. Judge Gaujot, 20-0940

Background:

Jacqulin Cowell, a resident of Morgantown Health and Rehabilitation Center, developed an unstageable decubitus ulcer and died June 25, 2018 (sepsis/osteomyelitis).
Kimberly Degler, administratrix of Cowell's estate, served an MPLA pre-suit notice and certificate of merit on Jan 29, 2020 and filed a wrongful death complaint May 15, 2020 alleging negligent medical care caused the death.
Morgantown Health moved to dismiss as time‑barred under the MPLA one‑year limitations provision (W. Va. Code § 55‑7B‑4(b)); Degler invoked the Wrongful Death Act two‑year limitation (W. Va. Code § 55‑7‑6(d)).
The circuit court denied dismissal, concluding that wrongful‑death claims alleging medical negligence are governed by the Wrongful Death Act’s two‑year period, not the MPLA’s one‑year injury period.
Morgantown sought a writ of prohibition from the West Virginia Supreme Court; the Court denied the writ, holding no clear legal error—MPLA and the Wrongful Death Act operate in concert and § 55‑7B‑4’s plain text addresses "injury," not "death."
The Court rejected Morgantown’s arguments that Miller v. Romero was overruled or that the 2003 MPLA amendments (the defined term "medical injury") altered § 55‑7B‑4’s plain meaning to subsume death claims.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Degler)	Defendant's Argument (Morgantown)	Held
Which statute of limitations governs wrongful‑death claims arising from medical negligence?	Wrongful Death Act §55‑7‑6(d) (two‑year period) governs death claims even when MPLA applies to the underlying negligence.	MPLA §55‑7B‑4(b) (one‑year period for "injury") controls because "medical injury" (per MPLA definition) includes death; the MPLA should be the exclusive statute for medical professional liability.	Held: Wrongful Death Act’s two‑year period applies to death claims; circuit court did not clearly err.
Is Miller v. Romero’s conclusion (that §55‑7B‑4 applies to injury, not death) still good law?	Miller remains sound; Bradshaw actually reinforces that wrongful‑death limitations are governed by §55‑7‑6 and permits discovery‑rule analysis.	Miller was dicta or undermined by Bradshaw; Miller’s reasoning no longer controls.	Held: Miller’s core conclusion stands; Bradshaw did not replace Miller’s point that §55‑7‑6 supplies the limitations period for death claims and in fact reinforced it regarding the discovery rule.
Did the 2003 MPLA amendment creating the term "medical injury" change §55‑7B‑4 so it now governs death claims?	§55‑7B‑4 still expressly uses "injury"; omission of "medical injury" there is deliberate; the Legislature’s placement of the defined term elsewhere reinforces that §55‑7‑4 was not amended to swallow wrongful‑death limits.	The Legislature’s definition of "medical injury" (including death) shows intent that MPLA’s provisions, including its limitations rule, cover deaths.	Held: Court will not read "medical injury" into §55‑7B‑4; statutes are reconciled by giving MPLA effect for personal injury and the Wrongful Death Act effect for death claims.
Is a writ of prohibition appropriate to review the circuit court’s denial of dismissal on statute‑of‑limitations grounds?	The remedy is properly denied; no clear legal error and normal appellate review exists.	Writ warranted because the circuit court misapplied the MPLA and committed a clear legal error.	Held: Writ denied under Hoover factors—issue is non‑jurisdictional and the circuit court’s ruling was not clearly erroneous as a matter of law.

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Romero, 186 W. Va. 523, 413 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1991) (concluded §55‑7B‑4 addresses "injury" and does not supplant Wrongful Death Act limitations for death claims)
Bradshaw v. Soulsby, 210 W. Va. 682, 558 S.E.2d 681 (W. Va. 2001) (applied discovery rule to wrongful‑death actions and reaffirmed that §55‑7‑6 governs the filing period for death claims)
Gray v. Mena, 218 W. Va. 564, 625 S.E.2d 326 (W. Va. 2005) (clarified MPLA covers liability for death or injury but did not make MPLA exclusive of the Wrongful Death Act)
Phillips v. Larry's Drive‑In Pharmacy, Inc., 220 W. Va. 484, 647 S.E.2d 920 (W. Va. 2007) (statutes in derogation of the common law must be narrowly construed)
Barber v. Camden Clark Mem. Hosp. Corp., 240 W. Va. 663, 815 S.E.2d 474 (W. Va. 2018) (statutory‑construction principle to give effect to each statute where possible)
Mack‑Evans v. Hilltop Healthcare Center, Inc., 226 W. Va. 257, 700 S.E.2d 317 (W. Va. 2010) (distinguishes personal‑injury survival actions from wrongful‑death actions)
State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (W. Va. 1996) (sets factors for issuing a discretionary writ of prohibition)