State Of Washington v. William Frederick Jensen, 74319-8

Background

William Jensen was convicted on four counts of solicitation to commit first-degree murder; the trial court entered a judgment and sentence that reserved restitution for a later hearing.
In June 2005 the court entered an agreed restitution order for $2,304.50 and authorized future counseling costs; Jensen did not appeal that restitution order.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed two convictions and remanded for vacation of those convictions and resentencing; a 2009 resentencing hearing followed.
At resentencing the court said it would "reimpose all the other conditions" of the original sentence (including restitution), but a prosecutor mistakenly told the court no prior restitution order existed; the new judgment ambiguously referenced a non‑existent Appendix E and set restitution to be determined at a future hearing.
A 2009 restitution hearing was later held; the court (orally) granted Jensen's motion to strike the hearing as untimely under RCW 9.94A.753(1), reasoning the 2005 order had expired because it was not reimposed at resentencing. No written order was entered then, but in 2015 the court entered written orders memorializing the 2009 ruling and striking the State’s motion to supplement restitution. The State appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Jensen)	Held
Whether the 2005 restitution order survived the partial reversal and resentencing, so that post‑resentencing hearings were modifications (not initial setting) and thus not subject to the 180‑day limit	2005 order remained in effect because the Supreme Court reversed only two convictions and remanded for resentencing; unappealed portions of the original judgment remain effective, so post‑resentencing proceedings were modifications and not time‑barred	Resentencing vacated the entire sentence; because the resentencing court did not reimpose the 2005 restitution order, that order expired and any later hearing to set restitution was subject to the 180‑day limit and therefore untimely	Court held the 2005 order survived remand (and was effectively reimposed by the resentencing court’s intent), so the later hearings were modification proceedings and not bound by the 180‑day limit; superior court erred in striking the hearings
Whether the State is barred from challenging the superior court’s timeliness ruling because the prosecutor conceded below that no prior restitution order existed	State argued it preserved the issue and, regardless, the concession and lack of victim notice do not prevent appellate review of an error of law affecting sentence or a constitutional right	Jensen argued the prosecutor’s concession below estopped the State from arguing the contrary on appeal	Court rejected Jensen’s estoppel argument: legal error in a sentence is reviewable; the record shows the State preserved its position; victims’ notice concerns further support review

Key Cases Cited

State v. Jensen, 164 Wn.2d 943 (2008) (Supreme Court decision reversing two convictions and remanding for vacation of those convictions and resentencing)
State v. Harrison, 148 Wn.2d 550 (2003) (discussion that when a sentence is reversed in full, entire sentence is vacated)
State v. Gray, 174 Wn.2d 920 (2012) (restitution may be modified after 180 days while offender remains under court jurisdiction)
State v. Rowland, 160 Wn. App. 316 (2011) (portions of an original judgment valid when pronounced remain unaffected by reversal of other counts)
State v. Kilgore, 167 Wn.2d 28 (2009) (principle that valid portions of a judgment survive reversal of other parts)