State of Washington v. Veniamin Ben Glushchenko, 33770-7

In December 2014 Glushchenko broke into a Spokane home where homeowner Ugur Erol was sleeping, was seen holding two steak knives, and stabbed/slashed Erol multiple times when Erol would not turn away. Erol escaped and called 911.
Minutes earlier Glushchenko had broken a kitchen window at a nearby house (Brenda Eberhart) and attempted to grab/demand money; she screamed and he left.
Police apprehended Glushchenko a few blocks away; officers observed blood on his hands. Both Erol (in a photo array) and Eberhart identified him. Two household steak knives were recovered from Erol’s home.
The State charged Glushchenko with first degree burglary, first degree robbery, and first degree assault (each with deadly weapon enhancements) for the Erol incident, and residential burglary for Eberhart’s house. A jury convicted him on all counts and found the deadly-weapon special verdicts.
At sentencing the court ruled the robbery and assault were the same criminal conduct but the burglary was separate; it imposed a midrange term plus weapon enhancements (total 291 months). The court also imposed mandatory legal financial obligations (LFOs) without a Blazina inquiry; Glushchenko did not object at trial.

Issue	Glushchenko's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for intent to inflict great bodily harm (1st‑degree assault)	No proof he intended to inflict great bodily harm; wounds did not prove intent	Jury could infer specific intent from manner of attack, repeated commands, deep wounds, and victim’s flight	Evidence sufficient to support conviction for 1st‑degree assault
Whether burglary was the same criminal conduct as robbery/assault for sentencing	Burglary and the later assault/robbery were part of the same criminal conduct	Burglary was committed with intent to steal and before encountering victim; stabbing constituted a separate, escalated intent	Trial court did not abuse discretion in treating burglary as separate from robbery/assault
Failure to conduct Blazina ability‑to‑pay inquiry before imposing LFOs	Trial court failed to conduct required on‑the‑record inquiry; remand needed	Only mandatory LFOs were imposed; Blazina applies to discretionary LFOs	No remand; Blazina inquiry not required for mandatory LFOs imposed here
Prosecutorial vindictiveness (pro se claim)	Adding robbery charge after plea negotiations failed was vindictive punishment for rejecting plea	Filing or amending charges after plea talks fail is permitted and not presumptively vindictive; no evidence of punitive motive	Claim rejected; appellant failed to show realistic likelihood of vindictiveness

State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827 (Blazina ability‑to‑pay inquiry requirement)
State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192 (standard for sufficiency review)
State v. Elmi, 166 Wn.2d 209 (specific intent as element of 1st‑degree assault)
State v. Lessley, 118 Wn.2d 773 (same criminal conduct rule under SRA)
State v. Korum, 157 Wn.2d 614 (prosecutorial vindictiveness standards)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance of counsel standard)

Outcome: The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentence.