State Of Washington, V Teri Michael Talbot, 49381-1

Background

In September 2015 Vancouver police ran an undercover online sting posting an ad purporting to seek sexual contact for a 12‑year‑old girl; Talbot (age 59) responded and engaged in explicit messaging and a phone call describing sexual acts and planning a meeting.
Messages and call show Talbot acknowledged the child’s age, described gradual sexual acts ("licking and sucking," avoiding ‘‘raw and sore’’), refused condoms, and agreed to meet first with the purported mother at a coffee shop then go to the apartment.
Talbot attended the agreed meeting location (Starbucks) and was arrested; he had no physical items on him.
Charged initially with attempted second degree child rape, amended to attempted second degree child molestation; bench trial resulted in guilty verdict for attempted second degree child molestation, not attempted rape.
Sentenced to 11.25 months confinement, 12 months community custody with conditions including required sexual deviancy evaluation/treatment and prohibition on possessing devices that access the internet or accessing the internet without prior DOC/treatment approval.
Talbot appealed, challenging (1) sufficiency of evidence as to intent and substantial step and (2) legality and constitutionality of the internet‑access community custody conditions. Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Talbot)	Held
Sufficiency — Intent to commit attempted 2nd‑degree child molestation	Messages and call show Talbot knew the child was 12 and described specific sexual acts and plans, demonstrating intent to have sexual contact with the child.	Talbot argued he was only contemplating sexual contact and had not formed the requisite intent to commit the crime.	Court: Evidence (age knowledge, explicit descriptions, planning) supports a rational finder could infer intent; sufficiency upheld.
Sufficiency — Substantial step toward the crime	Talbot’s confirmation to meet, detailed plan for sex, and appearance at the agreed coffee shop were acts strongly corroborative of criminal purpose (substantial step).	Talbot contended communications were still in negotiation/preparatory stage and his arrival at the coffee shop was not enough (citing cases distinguishing mere negotiation).	Court: Meeting agreement and Talbot’s appearance moved beyond negotiation; substantial step established; sufficiency upheld.
Legality & constitutionality of internet ban condition	Condition is crime‑related because the internet was the medium used to commit the offense; limiting access (with approval mechanism) is reasonably necessary and sensitively imposed and does not overly infringe First Amendment rights.	Talbot argued the conditions exceeded statutory authority and unconstitutionally burdened lawful internet use and First Amendment rights (overbroad).	Court: Sentencing court had statutory authority to impose crime‑related prohibitions; condition was reasonably related, sensitively imposed, and not overbroad; upheld.

Key Cases Cited

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (establishes prosecution must prove elements beyond a reasonable doubt)
State v. Homan, 181 Wn.2d 102 (standard for sufficiency review in Washington)
State v. Johnson, 173 Wn.2d 895 (attempt requires intent to commit the specific underlying crime)
State v. Townsend, 147 Wn.2d 666 (sustaining attempt conviction where defendant went to agreed meeting place with intent)
State v. Sivins, 138 Wn. App. 52 (travel and motel rental after online sexual communications constituted substantial steps)
State v. Wilson, 158 Wn. App. 305 (arriving at meeting location with agreed consideration supported substantial‑step finding)
State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739 (First Amendment limits on probation/community custody conditions; conditions must be reasonably necessary and sensitively imposed)