State Of Washington v. Steven W. Tower
48831-1
| Wash. Ct. App. | May 16, 2017Background
- On Dec. 3, 2015, Deputy VanWyck observed Steven Tower walking east along SR 308 in the same direction as traffic on a two‑lane road with no sidewalk.
- VanWyck stopped, activated lights, and asked Tower for ID; Tower had no driver’s license but gave his name.
- VanWyck told Tower he needed to walk on the left side facing traffic; Tower crossed the road as instructed.
- VanWyck ran a warrant check from his patrol car, learned Tower had an active arrest warrant, recontacted and detained Tower, and dispatch confirmed the warrant.
- VanWyck arrested Tower on the warrant and searched him incident to arrest, finding a baggie that field‑tested positive for methamphetamine.
- Tower moved to suppress the methamphetamine, arguing the initial stop was unlawful/pretextual and thus the search was unlawful; the trial court denied suppression, and Tower was convicted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Tower) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the initial stop lawful? | Stop lawful because Tower violated RCW 46.61.250 by walking with traffic when sidewalks absent; officer may detain for ID and warrant check. | Stop was pretextual and Tower did not necessarily commit an infraction because statute applies only "when practicable." | Stop lawful: probable cause to believe an infraction occurred; pretext argument not preserved, so not considered. |
| Was the challenged factual finding supported by evidence? | Deputy testified Tower was walking with traffic and was told to walk facing traffic; supports finding. | Finding 1.5 (knowledge of statute) unsupported by substantial evidence. | Finding 1.5 supported by substantial evidence; unchallenged factual findings are verities. |
| Was the search that produced methamphetamine lawful? | Search lawful as incident to valid arrest based on confirmed outstanding warrant. | If stop/search unlawful, evidence should be suppressed. | Search incident to arrest valid because arrest was supported by warrant; suppression properly denied. |
| Was the pretextual‑stop doctrine applicable on appeal? | N/A | Stop was pretextual under State v. Ladson; stop thus unconstitutional. | Pretext argument waived for appeal because Tower failed to raise it below (RAP 2.5(a)). |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343 (1999) (pretextual stop doctrine and suppression principles)
- State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61 (1996) (warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless an exception applies)
- State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143 (1980) (exceptions to the warrant requirement are narrowly drawn)
- York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297 (2008) (listing recognized exceptions to warrant requirement)
- Lohr v. State, 164 Wn. App. 414 (2011) (standard of review for suppression rulings: factual findings deferential, legal conclusions de novo)
- Stutz v. Moody, 3 Wn. App. 457 (1970) ("when practicable" language in pedestrian statute may be fact question)
- State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91 (2009) (RAP 2.5(a) and waiver of appellate issues not raised below)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Terry stop investigative‑stop principles)