State Of Washington v. Steven Pink, 46858-1

Steven E. Pink pleaded guilty to first-degree assault in 2014; the sentencing court calculated an offender score of 8 and imposed a 277-month sentence (high end of standard range).
The offender score included two 1981 Washington convictions (second-degree theft; taking a motor vehicle without permission), a 1983 Oregon second-degree robbery conviction, and a 1995 Washington conviction for unlawful delivery of methamphetamine.
Pink challenged inclusion of the 1995 conviction (arguing it was facially unconstitutional because he was misadvised about the statutory maximum) and, in a SAG, challenged the 1983 Oregon conviction (claiming his plea there was involuntary).
In a consolidated PRP, Pink additionally argued the two 1981 convictions should count as one point because they were ordered concurrent, and he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to that scoring.
The court concluded the 1995 conviction was facially valid (doubling did not apply to former RCW 69.50.401), the 1983 Oregon challenge was not properly raised on sentencing (would require matters outside the record), and the 1981 convictions properly counted separately because their concurrency resulted from a probation revocation and the controlling sentencing-law date is the current offense date.

Issue	Pink's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Inclusion of 1995 conviction in offender score	1995 plea/judgment is facially invalid because he was misadvised about doubled statutory maximum	1995 conviction facially valid; doubling statute excluded RCW 69.50.401 so advisement was correct	Conviction may be counted; no sentencing error
Inclusion of 1983 Oregon conviction	Plea involuntary because Oregon court failed to advise constitutional rights	Challenge not properly raised at sentencing; would require record beyond judgment	Not considered on direct appeal (procedurally improper)
Counting two 1981 convictions separately	Sentences were concurrent so should count as one point	Concurrency resulted from probation revocation; statute treats those as separate for offender score when concurrency stems from revocation; law effective at time of current offense controls	Counted separately; no offender-score error
Ineffective assistance for failure to object to 1981 scoring	Counsel deficient for not objecting, prejudicing sentence	No deficiency or prejudice because scoring was correct	Claim fails under Strickland; PRP denied

State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175 (1986) (prior convictions generally may be used at sentencing unless facially unconstitutional)
State v. Cobos, 182 Wn.2d 12 (2015) (remedy for improper offender score is remand for resentencing)
State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322 (1995) (issues dependent on matters outside the record are not reviewable on direct appeal)
In re Pers. Restraint of Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861 (2002) (sentence based on incorrect offender score is a fundamental defect warranting relief)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-pronged ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standard)