State Of Washington v. Sloan Stanley
74204-3
| Wash. Ct. App. | Sep 5, 2017Background
- Sloan Stanley, banned from a Seattle pub in 2010, sent repeated hostile and graphic electronic messages (emails and Facebook) from 2010–2014 to four women who had been patrons or staff of the pub.
- Messages included explicit threats to kill and graphic descriptions of violence; victims reported fear and, in one instance, obtained a permanent stalking protection order.
- Stanley admitted to police he had harassed the women for years, used the alias “Erwin Jenkins,” and threatened to kill them to "break them down," "increase their stress," and to "scare" them.
- The State charged nine counts of felony cyberstalking (threats to kill) against Stanley; he represented himself at trial and was convicted on all counts.
- On appeal Stanley raised: jury instruction on "true threat" standard, sufficiency of evidence for two counts, facial overbreadth and vagueness of RCW 9.61.260 (cyberstalking), and alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Stanley) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper standard for "true threat" instruction | Apply Washington's objective reasonable-person test (true threats unprotected) | Elonis/Black require subjective intent test; federal Supreme Court precedent should control | Court follows Washington Supreme Court (State v. Trey M.): objective reasonable-person test is correct; instruction upheld |
| Sufficiency of evidence for counts alleging threats to kill (counts 6 & 9) | Evidence (hundreds of threats, context, victims' fear, Stanley's admissions) suffices under objective test | Insufficient — some statements ambiguous or expressive, not true threats | Independent review finds context and admissions support that reasonable speaker would foresee statements as serious threats; convictions affirmed |
| Facial overbreadth and vagueness of RCW 9.61.260 (esp. "harass" and "indecent") | Statute regulates conduct (with specific intent) and mirrors telephone-harassment precedents; not substantially overbroad or vague | Terms like "harass"/"indecent" and "intent to embarrass" are vague/overbroad and chill protected speech | "Harass" and "indecent" not unconstitutionally vague/overbroad given intent element; court reserves on broader "intent to embarrass" question but finds any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for this case |
| Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument | Prosecutor misstated one fact and misstated law; Stanley objected | Misstatements prejudiced defendant and shifted burden of proof | One factual misstatement was harmless; no prejudicial burden-shifting shown (no timely objection for latter); claims fail |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d 36 (Wash. 2004) (defines "true threat" and objective reasonable-person standard)
- State v. Schaler, 169 Wn.2d 274 (Wash. 2010) (reiterates true-threat doctrine and mens rea issues)
- State v. Trey M., 186 Wn.2d 884 (Wash. 2016) (Washington Supreme Court rejected adopting a subjective intent test from Elonis; binds lower courts)
- City of Seattle v. Huff, 111 Wn.2d 923 (Wash. 1988) (telephone-harassment precedent upholding statutes requiring intent to harass/intimidate)
- State v. Alexander, 76 Wn. App. 830 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (upholds harassment mens rea as narrowing statute and defeating overbreadth)
- State v. Alphonse, 147 Wn. App. 891 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (rejects vagueness challenge to harassment statute where intent to offend was shown)
- Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (U.S. 1984) (framework for independent appellate review when First Amendment rights implicated)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (U.S. 2003) (Supreme Court discussion of cross-burning and true threats)
Affirmed.